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Abstract 
The merits of consociational democracy as a suitable approach in achieving 
stabilization in plural societies, especially societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, 
have come under fire in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper argues that the 
consociational approach enshrined in the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 
Bosnian conflict in 1995, has been unable to fulfill the stabilizing potential due to the 
active interference of international institutions. Too frequently international actors have 
offered “quick fixes” to heal Bosnia; however, in attempting to reform, international 
figures undermine the existing consociational framework. This is the irony of prolonged 
intervention. A mathematical proof of accommodation by consociational logic further 
accentuates this claim by demonstrating that the problem is not with consociationalism, 
but rather with outside intervention. 
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Preface 
The first place I travelled to in Bosnia was Banja Luka. I had learned that this was 
the one place in the world McDonalds had not stayed in business. High quality meat was 
too affordable for the American-based chain to appeal to customers. When I tried the 
local meat dish ćevapi, I saw how far short the Big Mac fell. It was simply incredible and 
my taste buds have been ruined ever since. Next I went to Jajce, the small mountain town 
renowned for its stunning waterfall. It was a hot day, so I went down to the river and put 
my feet in the cool lapping water. After a few minutes I heard someone shouting deeply 
at me from behind: it was the police. They informed me I was in danger of falling in and 
washing down the waterfall. But, this was explained in Bosnian to me, and I believed I 
was in grave danger given the aggression in the officers’ tone. I put my hands in the air 
and froze, motionless. The officers looked at each other and then started laughing. My 
last stop was the capital, Sarajevo. I was blown away. Mountains, reminiscent of my 
hometown Boulder, Colorado, surrounded the city on all sides. I woke up to the smell of 
fresh burek and coffee and the sound of prayer and bells mixed together from the 
countless mosques and churches. One day, I wandered into a Catholic church, and was 
approached by a young man, about my age, who had just entered the seminary. I 
explained I was Irish Catholic and he took an immediate interest in me. We became 
acquaintances, and he invited me to Sunday mass the following day. Little did I know, at 
this mass I would be shaking hands and praying with a Croatian archbishop. The last 
place I visited was Srebrenica. This is where my path to writing this paper began, and this 
is where I will begin my introduction. I will never fully recover from the shock of that 
day. I dedicate this thesis to those names on the graves at Srebrenica, all the innocent 
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lives lost in the Bosnian war, and all of the lives that are still affected by the misery that 
has followed.  
Almost a year later, I travelled to Sarajevo to conduct research for this thesis. I 
was taking the bus from Serbia, and I noticed this time after I crossed the river into 
Bosnia, that a village on the journey that was flying green flags. I realized this was the 
symbol of a Bosniak Muslim community. Then, the bus went over a small hill into the 
next valley. Here was a town without a single mosque and the colors of red, white, and 
blue flying in a distinct Serbian pattern. I cannot understand what it would be like 
growing up in such a divided society. When the bus arrived in Sarajevo, we were unable 
to use the main transit center. Instead, the buses to and from Serbia must use another 
smaller station, on the Serb side of the town. Lucky for me, the taxi drivers at the station 
took Serbian Dinars. But after the twenty-minute drive to the other side of Sarajevo, the 
staff at my accommodations would not accept this same currency. Little did I know, I had 
just crossed a border that cuts through the Bosnia’s capital. Two decades before, this 
border was the scene of intense violence, and I could now see, this invisible border still 
remained a very real divide. 
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Introduction 
 In 1993, ethnic war had consumed the region of Yugoslavia since the nations of 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia declared independence. All had been bloody, but none so 
much as the multi-ethnic Bosnia. Communities of Bosniaks (Muslim), Serbs and Croats 
were suddenly trapped in a land crawling with enemies, seeking to use any means to 
establish the authority of their ethno-nationalist group.  In March 1993, 60,000 mainly 
Bosniak refugees swelled into the little Bosnian town Srebrenica without sufficient 
materials of survival. United Nations commander Philippe Marillion was beckoned to the 
town from worldwide the cries for humanitarian aid. He replied, “You are now under the 
protection of the United Nations … I will never abandon you.”1 He was mistaken. In 
April, Bosnian Serb forces commanded by General Ratko Mladic surrounded the town of 
Srebrenica. The U.N. declared the city a safe zone, but Serb forces cut off the town of 
basic necessities for many months to force surrender. Then, tensions in Srebrenica 
escalated in 1995 as NATO bombed a nearby Serb munitions enclave. In response, a Serb 
assault took 400, mainly Dutch, U.N. peacekeepers hostage. This move gave room for the 
Serbs to bargain with the U.N., ultimately leading the U.N. relinquishing control of the 
thousands of refugees they had sworn to protect in Srebrenica. The Serb forces descended 
into the camps raping and killing at will. July 11, 1995, as international forces tried to 
regain protection for the refugees of Srebrenica, General Mladic corralled all the refugee 
males of military age and murdered them outright. 7,079 were killed in the Srebrenica 
massacre: the bloodiest day on European soil since World War II. In response, NATO 																																																								
1 David Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst 
Massacre Since World War II, NY: Penguin Books, 2012, 
http://rbdigital.oneclickdigital.com. 
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Operation Deliberate Force dropped over a thousand bombs on Serbian forces, crippling 
their military and forcing them to the negotiating table by the end of summer. Peace was 
finally secured; there is no doubt the NATO campaign led by the United States saved 
thousands from perishing like those at Srebrenica. 
 Considering the bloody context of Bosnia, the United States’ aim of intervention 
is justified. Morally, the sheer number of innocent deaths at the heart of Europe was a 
calamity. Politically, the Clinton Administration was brought under immense pressure 
after two years of standing by. Strategically, the viability of NATO was on the line. Ivo 
H. Daalder concludes there are five principle reasons the United States decided in August 
1995, after watching the Bosnian conflict for well over two years, to engage in 
intervention, “The expected collapse of UNPROFOR following the humiliation of the 
hostage crisis; the threat Bosnia posed to the vitality, if not continued vitality, of NATO; 
the prospect of having to deploy U.S. troops to rescue UN forces and sustain the 
alliance’s credibility; and congressional pressure to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. 
Undergirding all of these was the president’s reelection campaign, then only months 
away.”2 The U.S. and its allies set an artificial twelve-month deadline for the removal of 
troops from the country. Ivo Daalder, the key strategist of U.S. policy in Bosnia, 
emphasized that President Clinton, learning from experience in Somalia and Haiti, 
wanted a concise “exit strategy.”3 However, once the American agenda of ending of the 
war was in reach, it quickly became a much harder issue of creating lasting peace in 
Bosnia. The United States and Western Allies secured peace on the European continent 
																																																								
2 Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: The Making of Americas Bosnia Policy. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 163.  
3 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 149. 
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through force then brought the leaders of the warring factions to Dayton, Ohio to ensure 
this catastrophe would not be repeated. The Dayton Peace Agreement was an 
accomplishment for global peace and enshrined Bosnia’s commitment to democracy. But, 
peace negotiations did not follow the traditional course of waiting for a solution for the 
political conflict to ripen; “Dayton differed from this traditional negotiating method by 
substituting American leadership and bluster for the parties’ commitment to search for a 
negotiated solution.” Therefore, Dayton becomes more an imposition than an agreement. 
Thus, the reality of lasting sustainable peace in Bosnia proved to be much more difficult 
than perhaps the United States imagined. 
In this thesis, I will argue that the international democratization in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, albeit in good faith, has been to the detriment of the fundamental logic on 
which it was designed. The logic of Dayton follows the age theory of consociationalism. 
Consociational theory has been key orthodoxy of comparative politics, and more 
specifically, in post-conflict constitutional design throughout the 20th century around the 
globe. In chapter IA, I summarize the work of Arend Lijphart, father of consociationalism 
and author of over a dozen seminal works on the topic, is outlined. I will define 
consociationalism as it was originally created. In Chapter IB, I will formalize Lijphart’s 
logic into a series of mathematical expressions. I will prove what previously had only 
been conjectured: that consociationalism will provide stability if implemented properly. 
Moreover, I prove that accommodation occurs under the conditions of a plural society as 
Lijphart theorized. This mathematical section is supplemental to this topic, but not 
necessary to understanding my argument on the Bosnian case study. 
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 Next, in Chapter II, I will outlay the historical background of Bosnia in brief, up 
until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1996, which ended the Yugoslav war 
of nationalist groups in Bosnia. I will illustrate how consociational theory can be slightly 
adjusted to fit the international context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lijphart did not 
consider the imposition of consociationalism onto a state, but theorists after him believed 
that this type of democracy can be “learned,” as if the Bosnian politicians are pupils of 
the global consociationalists. Lastly, I will demonstrate how Dayton formerly endorsed 
imposed consociational mechanisms and institutions on the Bosnian state. In all, chapter 
2 shows that Bosnia can be accurately termed as a consociational democracy. 
 Chapter III argues that the Office of High Representative, tasked with the civilian 
implementation of Dayton, is the specific teacher of consociational means of political 
consensus. This institution is the appendage of the global intervening powers and 
illustrates the principal ongoing international effort in Bosnia. However, through the 
overbearing usage of the Bonn powers, the Office of High Representative reversed the 
incentive structure for the politicians to compromise. Instead of consociational logic 
providing accommodation, the theory became the means of ethnic fragmentation. I will 
demonstrate this is due to the scapegoat-dependency cycle perpetuated by the Office of 
High Representative and not consociational theory in itself. 
 In Chapter IV, I will describe an alternative theory to that of consociationalism, 
which is called centripetalism. Based on the extensive works of Donald L. Horowitz, the 
theory runs in contradiction to consociationalism, except that both would reject a simple 
majoritarian system. Horowitz and Lijphart have different visions of constitutional design 
in plural societies like Bosnia. I will examine how three different attempts to implement 
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centripetalist reforms within the larger consociational framework significantly 
undermined the success of the former theory. Alternative voting in the Republika Srpska 
entity, a heterogeneous populace of the Brcko district, and a foreign bolstering of the 
2000 centrist coalition – The Alliance For Change – are three measures that backfired on 
the consociational fabric that provides stability in the country.  
 Finally, chapter 5 focuses on the immense pressure from European institutions to 
accommodate on behalf of their demands. Because the conditionality principles of 
accession to the European Union are non-negotiable, the consociational logic of 
consensus is undermined. The method of consociational compromise is unable to 
function with such an imposing and inflexible force. Further, the issue of police reform 
demonstrates that the Bosnian politicians and the European elites are concerned with 
occasional gestures of goodwill rather than real change. I argue that state capture by the 
politicians in Bosnia, encouraged by the IMF privatization procedures, has rendered 
democratic accountability null and void. Last, The 2009 Sejdic and Finci decision by the 
European Court for Human Rights demonstrates how European pressure, by trying to fix 
the situation, frequently and consistently makes matters worse. In this example, the 
decision allowed the Croat Question to destabilize the electoral system. This poses the 
gravest crisis facing Bosnia in 2018. 
 In conclusion, this thesis argues that the efforts of the international community in 
Bosnia have been detrimental to consociational theory. Ironically, the more the foreigners 
try to help, the worse the situation becomes. I suggest halting European imposition, 
issuing OHR closure, ending centripetalist ideology, and returning to a classroom of 
consociational learning approach. Yet, perhaps it is too late for this relationship to 
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develop in Bosnia. There are no ‘easy fixes’ to this dire situation, and I will not attempt 
to provide one. Rather, my main argument is that ‘easy fixes’ are what killed 
consociational democracy in Bosnia, and that the next international democratization 
campaign in a highly divided society ought to learn from the Bosnian paradox. Even 
efforts in good faith are harmful to the hope of consociational democratization. 
 I have Romanized all names of individuals and locations in this thesis. Also, I 
refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina as simply Bosnia throughout the thesis.   
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Chapter IA: Consociational Theory 
The leaders of rival subcultures may engage in competitive behavior and thus 
further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also 
make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects 
of cultural fragmentation. As a result of such overarching cooperation at the elite 
level, a country can, as Claude Ake states, “achieve a degree of political stability 
quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity.”4 
—Arend Lijphart 
 Consociationalism represents one of the leading theories of comparative 
politics. This is largely due to the extensive works of Arend Lijphart, a Dutch scholar of 
constitutional design. Arend Lijphart formed the theory from observing his native 
country, the Netherlands. He noticed the stability of the Dutch democratic state despite 
an, “extraordinary degree of social cleavage,” between the traditional Dutch factions of 
Calvinists, Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals in what he called a plural society. Lijphart 
believed that the segmental cleavages were not a mere fiction of rhetoric to serve the 
political elite, but solidified blocs of society. Thus, Lijphart established a configuration 
for this type of society both empirical and normative in form. He portrayed Dutch society 
as “highly elitist,” thus passively accepting the rule of the political elite. This, he argued, 
is the “secret of its success.”5 In a highly elitist society, the elite is capable of bridging the 
divided citizenry even when very little interaction occurs between them. Even if the blocs 
that make up society have exceptional distance between them, the elites form an all-
embracing continuum of accommodation, “Overarching cooperation at the elite level can 
																																																								
4 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969), 
doi:10.2307/2009820, 212. 
5 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the 
Netherlands, 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975, 103.  
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be a substitute for cross-cutting affiliations at the mass level.”6 This example illuminates 
the early developments of consociationalism. Even if citizens from different cleavages do 
not agree, or even interact, the elite would possess the incentive to compromise across 
dividing lines by the consociational framework.  
It may be difficult, but it is not at all impossible to achieve and maintain stable 
democratic government in a plural society. In a consociational democracy, the 
centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the 
cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the 
population.7 
 
 Lijphart believed that majoritarian democracy is akin to tyranny of the majority in 
plural societies. Thus, majority rule is conducive to civil conflict in plural societies, 
“consociational democracy violates the principle of majority rule, but it does not deviate 
very much from normative democratic theory.”8 Therefore, divided societies must not 
implement majority-based mechanisms. Instead, Lijphart outlines four criteria that are 
conducive to democracy in plural societies: (1) grand coalition – an overarching 
cooperation of elites from each cleavage, (2) mutual veto – cleavages are able to block 
one another in turn (3) proportionality – representation is based on population, and (4) 
segmental autonomy – each cleavage is granted some degree of legal independence.9 
Lijphart clearly emphasizes the grand coalition as the most significant factor of the 
consociational framework, “Grand coalitions violate the rule in parliamentary systems 
																																																								
6 David Earle Bohn, “Consociational Democracy and the Case of Switzerland,” The 
Journal of Politics 42, no. 1 (1980): 169. 
7 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, London: Yale University Press, 
1977, 1. 
8 Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 214. 
9 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 1. 
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cabinets should have, and normally do have, majority support, but not the support of an 
overwhelming majority.”10 Therefore, in the consociational model, an adverse opposition 
does not exist as it does in the minimum-winning coalition framework. Majority rule is 
intentionally neglected in order to accommodate the views of minorities in an 
encompassing union.  
 Mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy are meant as measures to 
ensure no cleavage is institutionally superior to another. Thus, a consociation can be 
summed as a framework where multiple communities can, “peacefully co-exist, with 
none being institutionally superior to the others, and in which the relevant communities 
co-operate politically through self-government and shared government.”11 This example 
highlights the goal of consociations to be a well-balanced unity of communities.  
 Consociationalism is intrinsically flexible, allowing numerous implementations 
of the four cleavages the theory promotes. The grand coalition was initially associated 
with the Dutch formation of a multiparty cabinet in the parliamentary system from 1917 
to 1967, but has expanded to many contexts around the globe. The Federal Council of 
Switzerland “offers an excellent example of such a grand coalition,” because it uses the 
“magic formula” 2:2:2:1 to split the seats of the executive among the three large parties 
and grants one to a smaller party. Additionally, there is an informal rule that the linguistic 
groups – French, German, and Italian – must be represented proportionately with the 
																																																								
10 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25-26. 
11 Brendan O’Leary, “Consociation: What We Know or Think We Know,” Paper 
presented at the Conference organized by the National and Ethnic Conflict Group 
(London: University of Western Ontario, November 8-10, 2002), 2, emphasis omitted.  
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population.12 Although Lijphart believes parliamentary regimes are less conducive to 
majoritarian tendencies, presidential systems have implemented grand coalitions as 
well.13 Typically this appears in the form of joint presidencies with separate platforms. 
For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a seat of its joint state tri-presidency reserved 
for a leader of each of the ethnic groups: Bosniak, Serb, and Croat. Furthermore, the 
community they represent elects each president, separating the platforms. Both 
presidential and parliamentary models can incorporate grand coalitions. Furthermore, it 
may be the case that each cleavage is constitutionally entitled to executive status. 
Perhaps, any given party that reaches a defined threshold is entitled to membership in the 
government. Lijphart references cases of these mechanisms in Belgium, Cyprus, and 
Fiji.14 The key in any case is that executive power sharing is inclusive across dividing 
lines rather than a minimal winning coalition such as the British model Lijphart laments 
in the context of plural societies. The grand coalition is the foundation of 
consociationalism; the latter three characteristics are intended to complement this device. 
 First, the mutual veto is necessary to ensure the grand coalition functions as a 
vestibule for minority empowerment. Since grand coalitions ensure the attendance of 
minorities, yet still must make decisions by majority consensus, “a minority veto must 
therefore be added to the grand coalition principle; only such a veto can give each 
segment a complete guarantee of political protection.”15 Lijphart strains the danger that 
																																																								
12 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus 
Government in Twenty-one Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984, 24. 
13 Arend Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in 
Theory and Practice, New York, NY: Routledge, 2008, 80. 
14 Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 81. 
15 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 36-37. 
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minority veto could lead to minority tyranny, thus upending the effectiveness of the 
consociational model. However, Lijphart quells this danger arguing that since the veto is 
mutual, then a group’s overuse will result in the reaction of other groups to use the veto 
retributively. Thus, there is an incentive to not use it superfluously. Lijphart describes 
how the Netherlands and Switzerland used the mutual veto informally, but in Austria the 
mutual veto had formal legal standing.16 
 The principle of proportionality is intended to inhibit majority rule, “It can be 
contrasted with winner take all principle of unrestrained majority rule,” while 
concurrently inducing the inclusion of all the social cleavages. This entails that 
allocations of civil service appointments and scarce financial resources are proportionate 
among the segments in the polity. To ensure parliamentary proportionality, Lijphart 
argues for an electoral system founded on proportional representation (PR). PR is an 
electoral system where voters cast their ballot for their preferred party and parties are 
allocated seats according to the proportion of votes they receive. The winning candidates 
are taken from the open or closed rankings of the party lists. Open means that the 
constituents can vote on individual candidates within the parties to ensure the party sends 
them to office, while closed entails the discretion of the party bosses. Additionally, PR 
systems can vary in the threshold of entry to office. Lijphart mentions Israel has too low 
of a threshold of 1 percent, while Germany’s is too high at 5 percent.17 Also, how the 
parliamentary seats are divvied out is calculated in various ways. The two most popular 
options are the Sainte-Laguë method, favoring small parties, and the d’Hondt formula, 
																																																								
16 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 38. 
17 Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns, 156. 
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giving large parties a bias. In conjunction with this method, “district magnitude” is an 
important factor of PR systems, which refers to how many representatives win in a given 
area. Lijhart recommends high district magnitude, to ensure smaller parties can earn 
representation.18 In all, Lijphart believes that proportionality makes minimal winning 
coalitions (i.e. majoritarian tyranny) less attractive because the power is shared across the 
cleavages accurately reflecting the demographics of the land.  
 The final aspect Lijphart underlined as conducive to the overarching consensus 
of a grand coalition is segmental autonomy, defined as, “rule by the minority over itself 
in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern.”19 On matters of common interest, the 
cleavages must come together with proportional degrees of influence backed by mutual 
veto, but otherwise ought to be left alone to manage their own affairs. Together with the 
proportional allocation of state funds, segmental autonomy allows a plural society to 
maintain stability. Moreover, autonomy allows segmental communities to safeguard their 
vital interests to ensure these interests are represented in the larger institutional body. 
Segmental autonomy could be incorporated territorially or through an internal fashion. 
The 1925 Law of Cultural Autonomy in Estonia inspired Lijphart to consider the internal 
option.20 According to the law, any ethnic group amounting to at least 3,000 members 
can establish a cultural council to be elected by the ethnic group, which would have 
jurisdiction over education and other cultural institutions, such as libraries, theatres, and 
museums. Plus, the councils could issue decrees, raise taxes, and were eligible for state 
subsidies so their schools were funded at the national standard. This example 
																																																								
18 Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns, 155. 
19 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 41. 
20 Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 71. 
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demonstrates how segmental autonomy need not rely on homogenous territorial 
boundaries. When homogenous communities do exist, such as the Francophone 
population of Canada is concentrated in Quebec, then, “federalism offers an especially 
attractive way of implementing the idea of segmental autonomy.”21 Therefore, the 
regional cleavages will coincide with the segmental cleavages. This is exemplified with 
the promotion of federalism and biculturalism in Canada to quell the separatist 
movements of French Quebec in the 1960’s.22 There exists a close correlation between 
federalism and consociation but Lijphart clarifies that federalism can be applied to non-
plural societies too.23 Furthermore, we have seen how federalism is just one way of 
operationalizing segmental autonomy. In conclusion, segmental autonomy remains the 
final component necessary to ensure a grand coalition of elites creates stability in plural 
societies. 
There are three factors that appear to be strongly conducive to the establishment 
or maintenance of cooperation among the elites in a fragmented system. The 
most striking of these is the existence of external threats to the country.24 
 
This example highlights the interpretation of external factors in Lijphart’s analysis of 
consociations. Lijphart emphasizes the fact that consociational democracies established in 
Lebanon, Switzerland and Austria under the hardship of the Second World War give 
credit to his notion that external forces can mobilize the consociational state. However, 
John McGarry, when confronting the context of Northern Ireland, argues that Lijphart is 
																																																								
21 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 43. 
22 Adrien Elleboudt, “The Limits of Consociationalism (As a Method of Conflict 
Management): Belgium and Canada as Crucial Tests,” (master’s thesis, Central European 
University, Budapest, 2007), 35, http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2007/elleboudt_adrien.pdf. 
23 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 42. 
24 Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 217.  
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too internally focused. He neglects the potential for external parties in consociational 
state building, and further emphasizes the moderating potential of inter-state institutions 
to achieving liberal democratization in consociations. On the other hand, Lijphart 
believes that the segments of consociations, above all, understand the “perils of 
fragmentation.”25  This demonstrates that Lijphart does not believe that a Hobbesian 
Leviathan is needed to implement consociational democracy. But similar to the fear that 
keeps man from descending into the Hobbesian state of nature, a “war of all against 
all,”26 the segments of a plural society will engage in accommodation through the 
incentives of consociational theory.  
																																																								
25 Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 216. 
26 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: A & C Black, 2006). 
 
Chapter 1B: The Mathematics of Consociational
Theory
April 26, 2018
1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will give a formal analytical assessment of Arend Lijphart’s theory of
consociational democracy. Lijphart suggests that the structure of democratic institutions
described in the previous chapter will lead to politics by accommodation. I assume, as
Lijphart does, that if I have accommodation then the society is stable. I will transform
Lijphart’s theory, and the incentive structure he creates for the political elite, into a set of
mathematical equations, derived from the work of G.R.Boynton and W.H. Khon. Acknowl-
edging that this analysis may distort Lijphart’s argument, Boynton and Khon believed that
the equations represent the most accurate formalization of Lijphart’s logic. I agree with this
assumption. Despite possible distortion, it is worthwhile to examine the theory through
mathematics due to the vast potential of elucidating solutions that become within reach.
Unlike Boynton and Kwon, in this chapter, I will come to the result that consociational
theory creates stability, and I will prove it mathematically.
2 Formalization of Consociational Logic
Boynton and Khon derived a set of five assumptions that sufficiently capture consociational
logic, I have added the sixth which will be used later in the proof.
1. The political actors are:
(a) divided in blocs
(b) within blocs they are divided into elites and citizens
2. There is no dialogue between the citizenry of different blocs.
3. The elite engage in political decision making by accommodation, forming a “grand
coalition.”
21
4. The elites of each bloc are independent of the citizens of each bloc.
5. The different blocs respond to the same political issue in different ways, forming
different reactionary opinions.
6. The political elite only give the impression of distance from the other blocs, but are
always positively induced toward consensus when it aligns with their interests. In
another way, the elite will not change their position because another bloc is closely
aligned with them.
For simplicity, we will begin with two blocs, and then add the third later. Boyton and Khon
configured mathematical equations from these five assumptions. The political problem is
the input of the function. Further, it is assumed that difference of opinion will occur, espe-
cially at the initial point of the equation. Accommodation is the merging of the opinions
to a single point. Therefore, the output is the views of the different groups over time (t).
Since change in views over time is what we are concerned with, let us create differential
equations to represent this process.
Using two blocs, there are four groups of interest:
C1(t): represents the position of the citizens in bloc 1 on a political issue at a given
time.
P1(t): represents the position of the political elite in bloc 1 on a political issue at a
given time.
C2(t): represents the position of the citizens in bloc 2 on a political issue at a given
time.
P2(t): represents the position of the political elite in bloc 2 on a political issue at a
given time.
The change of the position of the groups over time will be represented as: C ′1(t), P
′
1(t),
C ′2(t), P
′
2(t).
Assumption 5 requires that the blocs react to the same political problem in different
ways.
Allow:
U(t) to represent the political problem being examined, or the input to the equation.
β1,β2,β3,β4 to represent the response of each group to the political problem.
Now, let us construct equations from the tools we defined to represent the effect of U(t),
the input, on the change of the positions of each bloc, the output. C ′1(t) = β1U(t) is an
example of how the input changes the output over time.
Assumption 4 states that the elite of each bloc are relatively independent of the citi-
zens, however the two groups within each bloc will influence one another. Politicians will
not let their position stray too far from their constituency, while citizens will be influenced
by their leaders. The difference between the position of groups positions over time is for-
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malized by the α coefficients:
C ′1(t) = α12[P1(t)− C1(t)] + β1U(t)
P ′1(t) = α21[C1(t)− P1(t)] + β2U(t)
C ′2(t) = α34[C2(t)− P2(t)]− β3U(t)
P ′2(t) = α34[C2(t)− P2(t)]− β3U(t)
Boyton and Kohn suggest that the influence of elite on citizenry is greater than citizenry on
elite.
α12 > α21
α34 > α43
Assumption 3 requires that the elite will engage in decision-making by accommoda-
tion. Thus, the political elite must compromise with the other politicians and are thereby
influenced by the difference between their views and the views of the other elite on the
issue.
P ′1(t) = α21[C1(t)− P1(t)] + α23[P2(t)− P1(t)] + β2U(t)
P ′2(t) = α34[C2(t)− P2(t)] + α32[P1(t)− P2(t)]− β3U(t)
Boyton and Kohn suggest that the influence of the elite on one another ought to be larger
than the influence of the citizenry on the elite.
α23, α32 > α21, α43
Assumption 2 requires no influence coupling among the citizen groups, so we leave that
one as is.
Lastly, assumption 6 requires that all α values are positive. This assumption means that
the elite will act in good faith, their antics of nationalism are acts of theater more so than
acts of deliberate non-accommodation.
Now we have our mathematical representation of consociational theory.
C ′1(t) = α12[P1(t)− C1(t)] + β1U(t)
C ′2(t) = α34[C2(t)− P2(t)]− β3U(t)
P ′1(t) = α21[C1(t)− P1(t)] + α23[P2(t)− P1(t)] + β2U(t)
P ′2(t) = α34[C2(t)− P2(t)] + α32[P1(t)− P2(t)]− β3U(t)
α23, α32 > α21, α43
α12 > α21
α34 > α43
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3 Analysis with Two Blocs
In mathematical analysis, bounded means there exists a real number that is greater than
any output of a function. We define the system as stable if and only if the positions of
the functions are bounded. The mathematical definition of convergence is that a series
will approach a limit more and more closely as a parameter of the function (time, in our
case) increases (or decreases). For example, if f(x) = 1
x
, then as x goes to infinity, f(x)
approaches zero. Similarly, if our equation approaches a value as t goes to infinity, then we
have convergence. These definitions are needed to begin the analysis.
Given U(t) is bounded, we can determine the following statement: if the outputs, C1(t),
P1(t), C2(t), P2(t), are bounded, then stability has been satisfied. If stability is satisfied,
then this would demonstrate the validity of Lijphart’s theory. Boynton and Khon suggest
that the simplest way to show stability is to ask whether the difference between the groups
are bounded. The authors conjecture that the difference is bounded, but I will prove that
the difference converges to zero under the conditions that U(t) approaches zero.
First, Boynton and Kohn correctly point out that only if the input U(t) is decreasing
and approaching zero will the system be stable. This is a more powerful statement than if
the input is bounded. Let’s consider Figure 1 and Figure 2. For identical conditions and
coefficients that are given above, but altering U(t) = e−t2 in Figure 1 to U(t) = sin(t),
the result is that the positions no longer converge. sin(t) is bounded by 1 and −1, but it is
not approaching zero like the Gaussian function in Figure 1. Both of the figures have the
same starting positions and use the coefficients defined as the following, which adhere to
the confines of the formalization of Lijphart’s theory, but while the positions of Figure 1
remain bounded, in Figure 2 the positions converge. Both are stable under the conditions
we defined.
To further illustrate the fact that U(t) approaching zero causes convergence, for any
starting points or coefficients, I have taken the example of U(t) = 1 with coefficients and
starting points defined as before. This example is depicted in Figure 3. Notice that the po-
sitions increase at the same rate, the same as U(t). This is because the differential system
of equations are linear with respect to U(t), therefore the slope of the positions of C1(t),
P1(t), C2(t), P2(t) will approach the value of U(t) as t increases. Furthermore, U(t) is not
bounded, so the positions of the citizens and politicians are not bounded and the system is
not stable.
From Figures 1, 2, and 3 we can determine that the overall system is marginally stable,
depending on if input U(t) is bounded as it is in Figures 1 and 2. Now, we will demonstrate
that the coefficients do not effect the marginal stability of the system of equations at all.
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Figure 1: U(t) = e−t2
Figure 2: U(t) = sin(x)
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Figure 3: U(t) = 1
4 Proof of Marginal Stability
Given that the equations are first order linear differential equations we want to put them in
the form of a nonhomogeneous matrix:
[x]′ = A[x] + g(t).
This can be done by using the following substitutions:
x1 = P1(t)− C1(t),
x2 = P2(t)− P1(t),
x3 = P2(t)− C2(t),
Making these substitutions in the original equations, we come up with a matrix equation
that captures the entire system of first order differential linear equations in the nonhomo-
geneous matrix form we want.
d
dt
x1x2
x3
 =
−(α12 + α21) α23 0α21 −(α23 + α32) −α34
0 −α32 −(α34 + α43)
x1x2
x3

Above, I have set U(t) = 0, as is the assumption I made, thus removing the input and
β elements from the system of equations. We are left with a homogeneous system of first
order linear equations with a real valued coefficient matrix A. I have done this in order to
consider if the coefficients cause the positions to be bounded or converge.
A =
−(α12 + α21) α23 0α21 −(α23 + α32) −α34
0 −α32 −(α34 + α43)

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The eigenvalues of the matrix follow the form
Ax = λx
(A− λI)x = 0
det(A− λI) = 0
This is the characteristic equation where det is the determinant of the matrix. Then, we use
this framework to solve for the eigenvalues of our matrix A.
(A− λI) =
−(α12 + α21)− λ α23 0α21 −(α12 + α12)− λ −α34
0 α32 −(α34 + α43)− λ

Let’s solve for the determinant of this matrix as follows:
(−(α12+α21)−λ)
[−(α23 + α32)− λ −α34
α32 −(α34 + α43)− λ
]
−α23
[
α21 −α34
0 −(α34 + α43)− λ
]
= 0
Now, use basic algebra to solve for the 3 values of λ in the cubic equation. These
answers could be real or complex. Let’s plug in the coefficients of α12, α23, α32, α43 = 0.7
and α34, α21 = 0.2 to provide an example. Notice, this means that we are using different
parameters than the figures of the previous section.
(−(0.7+0.2)−λ)
[−(0.7 + 0.7)− λ −0.2
0.7 −(0.2 + 0.7)− λ
]
−0.7
[
0.2 −0.2
0 −(0.7 + 0.7)− λ
]
= 0
When solved under these conditions, the eigenvalues are
1
20
(−23−
√
137),− 9
10
,
1
20
(−23 +
√
137).
This is approximately (−1.735,−0.900,−0.565) rounded to the nearest thousandths.
I have shown a method of solving for the eigenvalues of the matrix with an example.
Now, by the Gershgorin Circle Theorem 1, I will prove that the real part of the eigenvalues
are all negative. Gershgorin’s Theorem states: Every eigenvalue of matrix Ann satisfies:
|λ− Aii| ≤
∞∑
i 6=j
|Aij|,
1”Gershgorin Circle Theorem,” Wikipedia, February 17, 2018, accessed April 25, 2018, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Gershgorin_circle_theorem.
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where
i ∈ 1, 2, ..., n.
Given, by assumption 6, that all of the α values are positive. It follows that from the
first column of matrix A that the first eigenvalue is in a circle centered at−(α12+α21) with
a radius of |α21|. Therefore the real part of the eigenvalue in this circle must be negative.
This is because the entire area of the circle is within negative space. Similarly, the second
column yields a circle centered at −(α23 + α32) with a radius of |α23| + | − α32|, which
yields a result of at most, zero. Since Gershgorin’s Theorem uses open circles, the real part
of the second eigenvalue must be negative. Lastly, the third column yields the final circle
centered at −(α34 + α43) with a radius of | − α43|, which yields a circle with an area that
is, once again, entirely in negative space. This proves that the real part of the eigenvalues
will be negative when n = 2 blocs.
If the real part of the eigenvalues are all negative, how does this prove convergence?
If we seek solutions in the form of x = ξert, then it follows that r must be an eigenvalue
and ξ a corresponding eigenvector of the coefficient matrix A. For our system of equations
n = 3, so there are 3 eigenvalues. Let’s allow the eigenvalues to be defined as r1, ...rn.
Recall, eigenvalues are the roots of the characteristic equation det(A− rI) = 0 Where I is
the identity matrix and det refers to the determinant. If A is real, then the coefficients in the
polynomial equation for r are real, and any complex eigenvalues must occur in conjugate
pairs. For example, if r1 = λ − iµ, where λ and µ are real, is an eigenvalue of A, then so
is r2 = λ− iµ.
It is obvious that if the eigenvalues are negative, then the solutions of the form x = ξert
will approach zero as t approaches infinity. By the Gershgorin Theorem, we proved that λ,
the real part of the eigenvalue, calculated from the coefficient matrix A, are always nega-
tive. Boyton and Kohn suggested that this could be true, but offered no proof. In summary,
I have proved that A[x], the homogeneous system of first order linear equations, converges
to zero. Therefore, the nonhomogeneous system of equations [x]′ = A[x] + g(t) will re-
sult in [x]′ = g(t) as t approaches infinity. This is because the general solution of the
nonhomogeneous form can be expressed as:
x = c1x
(1)(t) + ...+ cnx
(n)(t) + g(t),
where g(t) is the particular solution of the nonhomogeneuous system.2 This conclusion
is what Figures 1,2,and 3 illustrate graphically, examine the difference between the lines
approach U(t). Therefore, given the six assumptions and n = 2 blocs, we have proved
that if U(t) approaches zero, then stability is satisfied. We have also proved that if U(t) is
bounded, then marginal stability satisfied.
2William E. Boyce and Richard C. DiPrima,Elementary Differential Equations and Boundary Value Prob-
lems, 10th ed.(New York: Wiley, 2012), 440
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5 Analysis with 3 Blocs
In this section, we will enlarge from n = 2 blocs to n = 3 blocs. Therefore, our basic
equations will now be as follows:
C ′1(t) = α11[P1(t)− C1(t)] + β1U(t),
C ′2(t) = α21[C2(t)− P2(t)]− β2U(t),
C ′3(t) = α31[C3(t)− P3(t)]− β3U(t),
P ′1(t) = α12[C1(t)− P1(t)] + α13[P2(t)− P1(t)] + α14[P3(t)− P1(t)] + β4U(t),
P ′2(t) = α22[C2(t)− P2(t)] + α23[P1(t)− P2(t)] + α24[P3(t)− P2(t)]− β5U(t),
P ′3(t) = α32[C3(t)− P3(t)] + α33[P1(t)− P3(t)] + α34[P2(t)− P3(t)] + β6U(t).
With this system of first order linear equations, I make the substitutions along the same
lines I did previously:
x1 = P1(t)− C1(t),
x2 = P2(t)− P1(t),
x3 = P2(t)− C2(t),
x4 = P2(t)− P3(t),
x5 = P3(t)− C3(t),
x6 = P3(t)− P1(t).
Then, I calculate the homogeneous matrix which represents the system of first order linear
equations.
d
dt

x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6

=

−(α12 + α11) α13 0 −α14 0 0
α12 −(α23 + α13) −α22 −α14 0 α24
0 −α23 −(α22 + α21) 0 0 α24
−α12 α13 0 −(α14 + α33) α32 α34
0 0 0 α33 −(α32 + α31) −α34
0 α23 α22 α33 −α32 −(α34 + α24))


x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6

In conclusion, I can determine that the Gershgorin Theorem is not strong enough to
prove that the real part of the eigenvalues are negative with n = 3. However, using software
to manipulate the coefficients, I observed that the eigenvalues always remained negative as
I manipulated the coefficients and starting points. Also, I observed that the eigenvalues
remained real as well. This encourages further investigation and a potential proof of n = 3
using something stronger than Gershgorin’s Theorem.
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6 Conclusion
I have proved that if we have stability, meaning that U(t) converges to 0, then the difference
between the positions of the politicians and the citizens of two blocs, under the assump-
tions of consociational theory provided, will converge to an arbitrary quantifiable value. It
follows, that within the context of a political system that seeks to remedy problems that
the society faces, U(t) can logically be expected to decrease over time. While this might
not always be the case in the electoral lifetimes of political elite, or even the lifetimes of
citizens, we can expect a polity to remedy social ills. For example, the debt a country could
be reasonably quantified as an increasing problem and input as U(t). But, monetary offi-
cials has discovered other ways of alleviate debt, such as increasing inflation and money
supply. This is just one example of how societies can remedy the problems they face in
multitudes of ways, making U(t) very difficult to quantify. Though, if we do assume that
the political elite and citizens have the collective incentive to remedy social problems, then
U(t) is approaching 0 and the proof provided in this paper demonstrates mathematically
that consociational democracy creates accommodation.
However, it would be much more noteworthy to prove the logic goes the other direction
as well, satisfying an “if and only if” math proof. I leave this as a challenge for future
mathematicians, along with proving that the conditions for 3 blocs also yield real negative
eigenvalues so this result can be applied to the general case.
Lastly, it is important to note, I never once was required to use the inequalities which
Boynton and Kwon derived for the α values. Perhaps these would become more important
when proving the real part of the eigenvalues are negative for n = 3 blocs, but it does not
seem likely. It does seem likely that the inequalities would make the system converge more
quickly, which is a significant result.
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Chapter II – Europe’s Forgotten Corner 
 
2.1 Bosnia Before Dayton 
April 1992 to January 1996, in a land of obscurity for most of the world, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, dominated world headlines and sound bites with news of mass 
conflict.27 Bosnia is a small hilled region of roughly four million people28 on the outskirts 
of Europe. In the 1990s, the region exploded into ethnic warfare, drawing in the eyes of 
the world like it had never before. Ethnic tensions collided, neighbors turned on 
neighbors, and families were split apart by the overnight identities: Croat, Muslim, and 
Serb. Under the banner of the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO), the great 
Western Powers swept into the bloody chaos in the summer of 1995. The Clinton 
administration led the Western nations of the world to a “miraculous” victory for peace, 
thus halting the most violent outbreak of European conflict since World War II. The 
International Criminal Court in The Hague condemned Bosnian atrocities as genocide for 
the first time since the Nuremburg Trials of the Nazis. After the horrors of World War II, 
Europe hoped to never let systematic murder wash up on its shores again – Bosnia proved 
otherwise. But thanks to NATO intervention, at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina became the shining exemplar of the Western liberal success 
story. Less than a decade before, the Berlin Wall crumbled into blocks of Soviet rumble. 
Peace in Bosnia, the front yard of the once great Soviet Union, was a key triumph for the 
																																																								
27 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International 
Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2. 
28 “Bosnia 2013 Census,” European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, 
September 15, 2017. https://epthinktank.eu/2014/01/27/bosnia-2013-census/. 
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West. But victory tasted bitter as we were all reminded of the horrors of ethnic cleansing. 
The democracies of the West had secured peace for the forgotten corner of Europe, but 
these powers failed to bring reconciliation for the blood spilled, and today the country is 
still locked in depressed stalemate. 
In the final months of the war, American lawyers, equipped with the latest 
gadgetry of Western democracy and humanitarian law, created an agreement that would 
supposedly quell the ethnic hatred. In the austere offices of Dayton, Ohio, leaders of the 
three sides of the Bosnian war and the Croatian and Serbian state leaders discussed the 
bargain. Later, it became known as the Dayton Accords, signed into affect in Paris in 
1996. The United States, under the Clinton Administration, took a central role in the 
intervention of Bosnia after failed European leadership in the early 1990s. President Bill 
Clinton spoke in defense of NATO military intervention and the active role of the United 
States in the peace agreement, “as NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace 
agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the mission. If we're not there, 
NATO will not be there. The peace will collapse; the war will reignite.”29 There were 
strong words ushered at the dawning of U.S. hegemonic order. Today, though the 
American promise of peace in Bosnia has held, the ideal of democratization has fallen 
woefully short. As the first major international intervention of many in the post-Cold War 
era, Bosnia offers the most revealing glimpse of the potential illogical implementation of 
consociational democracy. 
																																																								
29 William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace 
Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” November 27, 1995, White House, Washington 
D.C. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50808. 
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2.1.1 Trading Empires 
 One need not glance deep into the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina to see it 
was no stranger to foreign occupation before the Americans arrived. The Ottoman Turks 
maintained control of Bosnia from 1463 until 1878 as a central province of their domain. 
Turkish influence became evident, most importantly establishing a permanent Muslim 
population in Bosnia. “Slav Muslims in Bosnia are the only nation, certainly in Europe 
and possibly in the world, who are nominally identified by their religion and not their 
language or ethnicity.”30 By the seventeenth century, two thirds of the population in 
Bosnia had converted to Islam and the term “Bosniak” became widespread in the region 
to identify as a Slavic Muslim. However Bosnian citizens coexisted peacefully, living in 
the same valleys and towns; even intermarriage was common. There are many accounts 
that the ancient-ethnic argument provided by the Clinton Administration to facilitate war 
was utter nonsense.31  
Bosnia traded hands in 1878 to the Austro-Hungarian Empire after suffering 
decades of frontier conflict squeezed between bellicose empires. In light of the external 
pressure, the passion of revolution began taking hold amongst neighboring Slavic 
peoples. In 1814, Serbs solidified secession from the Ottoman Empire; for the first time 
in three centuries, Serbs governed themselves. But it took a second uprising, 1815-1817 
																																																								
30 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 
1996), 139. 
31 Stevan Bozanich, “Debunking the Myth of Yugoslavia's ‘Ancient Ethnic 
Hatreds’,” ResearchWorks Archive, University of Washington, June, 2016, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1773/35996.	
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to free the Serbs permanently from the Turks. Similarly, a Croatian national revival 
occurred in the 1830’s through the Illyrian movement.32 Croatian domestic autonomy 
within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was won bloodlessly in 1867.  Over the next few 
decades, relations between Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires would continue to 
deteriorate, with the Serb, Croat, and Bosnian regions squeezed in the military frontier.  
Tensions hit the apex on June 28, 1914. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the 
Austrian-Hungarian throne, was assassinated on the streets of Bosnia’s capital city, 
Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, spilled the royal blood in the name of Bosnian 
independence. In result, Bosnian Croats staged massive anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo. 
Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia, Russia mobilized to defend the Serbs, and dominos 
across the world began to fall; alliances were drawn, legions swept across oceans, the 
first global war had began, Bosnia’s Sarajevo its matchbox. In 1918, the war ended and 
emerged the formation of various new political entities, one of which was the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Then, a decade later, this state would expand. The dreams 
of southern Slavs were fully achieved; the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was borne. However, 
the Bosnian territory was eliminated under the new regime, absorbed into surrounding 
larger powers yet again.  
Stepping back, Bosnia, and the Balkans as a whole, had created a boisterous 
reputation in the globe from the events of WWI. This is in part due to ethnic fabric of 
Bosnia was quite different than many places in the world. Of course, this was due to the 
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vast amount of external pressure the region had received for centuries. Thus, ethnic 
identities were constructed differently. Joane Nagel provides a suitable description of this 
process, “Ethnicity is constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, 
appearance, ancestry, or regionality. The location and meaning of particular ethnic 
boundaries are continuously negotiated, revised, and revitalized, both by ethnic group 
members themselves as well as by outside observers.”33 Bosnia, thus, must be defined by 
its demographic complexity.34  Bosnia lives on the crossroads of Orthodoxy, Catholicism 
and Islam. Thus, religion served as the ethnic divisor. BiH (Bosnian) Croats were 
Catholic, BiH Serbs were Orthodox, and Bosniaks, as mentioned prior, were a firmly 
established Islamic community. All spoke the same tongue, shared the same Slavic blood, 
and lived immersed amongst each other; yet, religion would become a tool of ethnic 
division wielded by the nationalists during the war in the 1990’s. Each town was unique 
in its own balance of ethnic tensions and camaraderie. From the global perspective, a 
shroud of mystery dwelt upon the region, depicted in Agatha Christie’s Murder on the 
Oriental Express published in 1934. This world-famous novelist catches the popular view 
of Yugoslav Kingdom as the troublesome corridor between Istanbul and Western Europe. 
In The Secret of Chimneys (1925) Christie writes, “It’s one of the Balkan States. . . . 
Principal rivers, unknown. Principal mountains, also unknown, but fairly numerous. 
Capital, Ekarest. Population, chiefly brigands. Hobby, assassinating kings and having 
revolutions.” This example demonstrates the mystery and instability that defined the 
Balkans, including Bosnia, in the early twentieth century.  
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Yugoslavia buckled under fascism in 1941 with the invasion of Adolf Hitler and 
the German forces. The Nazis buttressed the formation of an independent fascist Croatian 
state, antagonizing the fragile ethnic coherence of the Balkans. The area of Bosnia fell 
into the hands of the Croatian fascists, called Ustashe, erecting concentration camps, 
similar to their Nazi patrons, to exterminate mainly Serbs. In response, paramilitary 
groups of Serbs, named Chetniks, fought back with equably unethical vengeance.  The 
region of modern day Bosnia was the apex of Serb-Croat engagement; Bosniaks were 
forced to take sides, often regrettably.35 Then, Yugoslav socialists, led by Josip Broz Tito, 
organized a Serb-dominated group, the Partisans, which led a rebellion defeating the 
Croatian fascists. Incredibly, the Partisans accomplished liberation from Axis control 
without any aid of external Allied powers, the only movement to have done so in World 
War II. The victors created a socialist state, named Yugoslavia, which carved the borders 
of Bosnia as one of its republics as it remains today. 
 
2.1.2 The Collapse of Yugoslavia 
 Tito was the dictator of the unification of southern Slavs experiment.  Under his 
administration, in 1974 Bosniaks were elevated from a national minority to a constituent 
nation, enshrining the identity in the constitution for the first time. Yugoslavia effectively 
subdued the animosity of the three ethnicities in Bosnia through the secular doctrine of 
socialism. Many hoped the Pandora’s box that erupted in World War II had dissipated, 
but as Croatia edged towards independence in the 1980’s, the tensions were proven to 
merely have been frozen by Tito, and now thawing with devastating consequences. The 
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decision of the International community to recognize Slovenian and Croatian 
independence “pushed Bosnia into the abyss” claims Misha Glenny, a Yugoslav wartime 
journalist.36 In many respects, he is correct. Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, both 
predominately peasantries, wished to annex territory for their “mother countries”. Despite 
being the landed aristocracy for centuries in Bosnia, the Bosniaks faction was muzzled in 
the political debate without a patron state in Yugoslavia. Consequently, Bosnia had three 
options when Croatia seceded: first, to remain in rump Yugoslavia with Serbia, second, to 
divide Bosnia as the nationalist leaders Milosevic (Serbia) and Tudjman (Croatia) had 
agreed, or third, to declare independence. Since Bosniaks and Croats rejected the first, 
Bosniaks and Yugoslavs rejected the second, and Serbs rejected the third, “(all) three 
roads led to war.”37 Glenny’s assertion is qualified by the fact that before the war only 
20% of Bosnian cities and towns were overwhelmingly populated by members of a single 
community before the war broke out.38 This would prove to be a potent recipe for 
neighbor against neighbor violence. But it is important to recognize the Croat-Bosniak-
Serb animosity was not ancient-ethnic hatred; it was rather nationalism, largely imported, 
that split Bosnian communities into identities based on WWII hysteria and propaganda. 
 Bosnia had not been an independent state since its medieval ancestry. There had 
always been a powerful external force, Ottomans, Austrian-Hungarians, or Yugoslavs, to 
deliberate between the three communities. In the brief window of 1941-1945 when 
external pressure collapsed, the results were horrific. Chetniks and Ustashe butchered one 
another outright. In spite of this historical context, on April 17, 1992 the International 
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Community recognized the independence of Bosnia, essentially issuing death sentences 
to minority populations in countless towns and villages around the formerly Yugoslv 
region. These cities had no means of protecting minority communities from the spillover 
of nationalistic hate. Additionally, the nationalistic political elite, for their own gain, 
embellished victim rhetoric of their own people. In October 1991, Serbian media ran a 
story that Croat forces had beaten an Orthodox priest. The same day, Croatian TV aired 
coverage of Serbian forces beating a Catholic priest. The stories were both true, but Serbs 
and Croats could only see their stations and had not the access to the blood on their 
hands.39  Sarajevo was an exception. Here both stories were covered, and all nationalist 
sides were mobilizing. In only a few months, the Serbs began bombarding the city. 
Naturally, Serbian TV did not divulge this to its millions of viewers. This saturation of 
victimization invigorated the war effort, and splintered Bosnia according to ethno-
nationalistic lines.   
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Figure 1.1 The Results of Ethnic Cleansing in the Bosnian War 
 
 The majority Serb region, Republika Srpska, proclaimed independence in 1992 
but failed to earn international endorsement due to considerable minority dissent of 
Bosniaks and Croats. Figure 1.1 above displays the mixed composition of Bosnia before 
the war, and how the territory of the Serbs (Republika Srpska) became more ethnically 
homogenous by the end of the war. Additionally, majority regions of Bosniaks and 
Croats became more concentrated in the Federation of BiH. This demonstrates how the 
Bosnian tragedy was caused by a highly heterogeneous demography, there was no 
peaceful solution satisfying each of the groups. What Figure 1.1 fails to really show is the 
extent of how heterogeneous the towns scattered across the hills of Bosnia; territorial 
majorities were a rarity before the war. But when the conflict began, criminal war used 
ethnic cleansing to fashion the homogenous population desired to prove legitimacy for a 
claim to any given territory. Innocent minorities were slaughtered on all sides, and this is 
the heart of the Bosnian tragedy. 
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 Misha Glenny argues that, “Bosnia could only have been saved if a political party 
which spanned the three communities had emerged after the collapse of communist 
rule.”40 Alas, not one law was passed in the Bosnian parliament in the eighteen months of 
its existence before war broke out. This example illustrates the impossibility of a pluralist 
system in Bosnia while the voters filed into three ethnic groups in 1993. The Western 
powers encouraged Croatian independence yet failed to prevent Bosnia from sliding into 
the abyss. Misha Glenny hereby claims the international community shares responsibility 
for the worst ethnic warfare that had plagued Europe since World War II. While he is 
indeed qualified in this claim, Glenny romanticizes the influence of foreign politicians on 
the people of Bosnia. Bosnia was teetering on the edge of chaos ever since nationalistic 
rhetoric entered the political foray of Yugoslavia again. With a rich history of autocracy, 
newly independent Bosnians were bound to follow nationalistic leaders rather than 
experiment with liberal democracy for the first time.  
 Bosnia split in two entities before the Yugoslav war poured over its borders. In 
1992, the Serbs attempted to secede from the newly independent state, creating an entity 
rather exclusively named Republika Srpska (Republic of Serbia). This discontinuous red 
territory is depicted in Figure 1.1. The other region became the Federation of BiH.  
Following a brutal campaign between Bosniaks and Croats in 1993 and 1994, the 
Washington Agreement peace deal fashioned by the American diplomats silenced the 
fighting within the Federation. This was the first step towards the ultimate Dayton peace 
bargain. First, war continued in Bosnia against the better-organized Bosnian Serb forces 
backed by its powerful patron, the Yugoslav army. Citizens absorbed the propaganda of 
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the brazen state media, making it nearly impossible to discern responsibility for the 
violence. For instance, Serbians were not aware that the Bosnian Serbs were the ones 
shelling Sarajevo, the capital and largest city of Bosnia, for nearly three years.  
 This changed in July 1995 in the hills of Srebrenica with a massacre of civilians 
that eerily resembled the nightmares of World War II. The systematic extermination of 
Bosniak male citizens by Serb militants caused the United States Clinton Administration 
to put NATO into decisive military action. Western forces were deployed for the first 
time since the fall of communism against a very different enemy from the typical Soviet-
backed villain. But, the Serbs were battered to the negotiating table within the year. The 
‘general framework for peace’ was initiated November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, United 
States. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia soon signed the treaty. The agreement, known as the Dayton 
Accords41, ended the war and created a unified Bosnian state de jure committed to 
consociational democracy, but simultaneously allowing international institutions 
sweeping latitude in Bosnian state building.  
 
2.2 The Dayton State 
 Transitioning to a extensive explanation of the characteristics of 
consociationalism, the Bosnian state level government possesses very limited capabilities 
under Dayton, strictly responsible for: foreign policy, foreign trade policy, monetary 
policy, state financial institutions, immigration, refugee and asylum law, international and 
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inter-entity criminal law enforcement, common and international communication 
facilities, and inter-entity transportation and air traffic control.42 All powers not 
specifically delegated to the central state, remain in the hands of the entities, which are 
the two federal contingents of Bosnia that will be the focus of the next section.43 
Moreover, roughly 80 percent of all institutional governance is located on the entity level. 
Bosnia is thus a highly decentralized state. For instance, only in 2006 did the central state 
add unified armed forces and a state border agency to its ranks. 
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Figure 2: Bosnia’s Executive and Legislative Anatomy 
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 2.2.1 The Executive 
  The state level executive is, theoretically, although the line is often blurred, 
divided into the tripartite Presidency and the Council of Ministers. The Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, often referred to as the Prime Minister, is nominated by the 
Presidency and approved by the House of Representatives.44 The Council of Ministers 
essentially governs the country, while the tripartite presidency leads the country. One of 
each ethnic group, Serb, Croat, and Bosniak, simultaneously occupy the head of the 
tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in an eight-month rotation. The joint 
Presidency’s major constitutional mandate is conducting the foreign policy of BiH45 
including selecting ambassadors and diplomatic representatives abroad under the 
condition ‘no more than two-thirds of whom can be selected from the Federation of BiH.’ 
This is a prime example of consociational logic that is the framework of the Dayton 
structure. The balance of the three ethnic groups is installed in the Presidency institution. 
The Serb president is elected from the Republika Srpska entity while the Bosniak and 
Croat presidents are elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity46; 
therefore, every ethnic cleavage is well represented in a power-sharing coalition. It must 
be noted that a voter in the Republika Srpska can only cast a ballot for a Serb candidate, 
while voters in the Federation of Bosnia can cast a ballot for either Bosniak or Croat. On 
the other hand, another example of consociational logic is in the provision that every 
ministry of the Council of Ministers, whether it is the Ministry of EU Integration or 
Health, must have one minister and two deputies each from respective ethnic cleavages. 
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Moreover, each government at the entity and cantonal level must abide by this protection 
as well. This creates an encompassing norm of grand coalition building.   
 
2.2.2 The Legislature 
 Dayton too sought that the legislative branch was also is founded upon 
consociational theory. There are two chambers of state level parliament – the House of 
Peoples and the House of Representatives. In a glaring example of the grand coalition 
element of Lijphart’s theory, the House of Peoples consists of five delegates of each 
ethnic group, selected institutionally, not by an electorate. Dayton chose to not prescribe 
the seats proportionally, but prioritizes the equality of the ethnic cleavages as the Council 
of Ministers does. On the other hand, the much larger legislative chamber is the House of 
Representatives with 42 members.47 Despite that 28 are selected from the Federation 
entity and 14 from the Republic Srpska entity, the characteristic of proportional 
representation is illustrated by the use of a party list system without ethnic constraints but 
based on the percentage of votes. The mandates are assigned according to the Sainte-
Laguë method. This proportionality device tends to favor smaller parties, keeping a 
mixed template within the Bosnian parliament. Thus, the proportional representation and 
grand coalition characteristics are achieved in the state legislature. 
 The most striking feature of Bosnian consociation, are the four veto mechanisms 
built in the system in line with the mutual veto insight Lijphart provided for a 
consociational system. First, the entity voting mechanism ensures that, in addition to 
securing an overall majority in parliament, one third of each of the two entities must 
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approve of a law as well.48 This clause especially favors the Serbs, which possess their 
own entity. Second, the members of the House of Peoples carry significant veto power of 
another vein. All legislation requires a minimum of a nine votes in the House of Peoples, 
“provided that at least three Bosniak, three Croat, and three Serb delegates are present.”49 
In effect, if three members of a certain group do not show up, then the entire legislative 
system is blocked. Third, the members of the House of Peoples can declare a law 
‘destructive to a vital interest’ of their respective cleavage, and then the law is sent to the 
three group delegations requiring a majority vote. Fourth, any of the three state presidents 
can trigger the ‘vital interest’ clause, forcing a vote in the House of Representatives by 
their group’s officials. If this obtains a two-thirds majority, the law will be struck dead 
immediately. All in all, Dayton ensures bloc parity, “The constitutional system was not 
created on the basis of the equality of individuals, but on the equality of ethnic groups.”50 
The mutual veto philosophy of Dayton ensures the stable balance of constituent peoples. 
 
2.2.3 The Judiciary 
 Ironically, one of the most significant features of the Bosnian framework is the 
one where non-Bosnians play a direct role: the Constitutional Court. (65 Post-Dayton) 
This is the supreme judicial organ of the state. Nine judges reside over this body: two 
Serbs nominated by RS National Assembly; two Croats and two Bosniaks from FBiH 
Parliament; and three foreigners nominated by the European Court of Human Rights after 
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consultation with the tripartite BiH Presidency.51 The court’s jurisdiction encompasses 
inter-entity disputes, state-entity disputed, and intra-state disputes. The Constitutional 
Court is the ultimate guarantor of the Dayton Accords in that it has jurisdiction whether 
any law at any level of government conflicts with the Bosnian Constitution (Annex 4 of 
Dayton). Therefore the consociational characteristics, recognized in the legislative and 
executive, are present again in the judiciary. For instance, if the House of People deem a 
law in violation of a ‘vital interest’ and further compromise is unreachable, then the 
Constitutional Court steps in, transforming the legislative process to a legal decision. This 
illustrates the consociational logic of the judiciary as the Court becomes involved in veto 
mechanisms.  
 In the summer of 2000, the court delivered a landmark verdict sanctioning all 
three ethnic groups, referred to as ‘constituent peoples,’ as fully entitled to representation 
throughout each level of governance in both entities. Consequently, those not of the three 
groups are termed ‘Others’ legally. In practice, this decision put mandatory institutional 
quotas for Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika Srpska entity and for Serbs in Federation 
of Bosnia entity. For example, after this decision the government, or council of ministers, 
of the Republika Srpska need consist of eight Serbs, five Bosniaks, three Croats, and one 
“other” that may or may not replace a Serb. This decision by the Constitutional Court 
enshrines the key characteristic of consociationalism in Bosnia: accommodation by a 
grand coalition of elites. The three social cleavages would be represented in every corner 
Bosnia on each level of governance. Grand coalitions in the Bosnian state, entities, 
cantons, and municipalities reinforced the consociational character of the democracy.  
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 Although, the constituent peoples decision has had unforeseeable consequences. 
December 22, 2009 the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg delivered the 
Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina verdict. The decision condemns the Dayton 
system exclusionary measures against BiH citizens that are not of the three constituent 
peoples. Dervo Sejdic and Jakob Finci were prominent Bosnian citizens of the Bosnian 
capital, Sarajevo; the former was of Roma origin and the latter a Jew.52 Thus, Sejdic and 
Finci are members of the ‘Others’ minority in Bosnia. Since Dayton prescribes the state-
level parliament chamber, the House of Peoples, and the BiH Presidency are composed 
solely and exclusively of constituent peoples, Roma and Jews cannot hold this public 
office. Both men lodged complaints with the European Court of Human Rights in 2006. 
The court acknowledged Dayton had served as a fragile ceasefire to end inter-ethnic 
conflict, but noted that considerable progress had since been made in Bosnia. Evidence to 
this affect being that Bosnia amended its constitution for the first time in 2009 and 
became a member of the UN Security Council for a two-year term. Nonetheless, the court 
agreed in December 2009, “the time was perhaps still not ripe for a political system that 
abandoned the power-sharing mechanism in place,” but that, “did not automatically lead 
to the total exclusion of representatives of the communities that were not constituent 
peoples.”53 The Bosnian parliament has yet to implement the decision. This inability has 
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contributed to Bosnia’s clogged accession to the European Union. Moreover, this case 
highlights how consociational democracy cannot accompany strong individual rights. The 
two are in logical disagreement, and this disagreement has dislodged the efficiency of 
courts throughout the Bosnian system. 
 
2.3 The Entities 
 As referenced in the previous section, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
contains two federal units called entities. They are the Republika Srpska (RS) and 
Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FBiH). The RS is predominantly Serb while Croats 
and Bosniaks share the FBiH. How the Bosnian state arrived at two territorial bodies 
instead of three, one for each ethnic group, is due to the outcomes of the war in the 90’s. 
In the preliminary stages of the conflict, strong nationalist ideology from Serbia and 
Croatia created an incentive for Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat war leaders to create 
“strong territorial segregation.” Therefore, in January 1992, the Serbs established the 
Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a few months afterwards; the Croats 
founded the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna. Meanwhile, the Bosniaks, though never 
exclusively, took the reigns of the newly independent Bosnian state, which had been 
diminished, to 20% of the Bosnian territory due to ambitious borders the Croats and 
Serbs drew. Moreover, as Misha Glenny points out, the territory of Bosnia was too mixed 
to draw clear boundaries as the nationalists wanted, “Many doomed settlements were a 
jumble of all three (Croat, Serb, and Muslim). This deeply entangled demography would 
ensure that if terror and war were to break out in any region of Yugoslavia, the pressure 
	 50	
on the three communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina to fight would be overwhelming.”54 As 
we know, this tragedy became too real. A border between the Croats and Bosniaks would 
never be found. The Washington Peace deal ended the fighting between the two groups in 
1994, establishing the roots of the Federation entity at a massive cost of life. On the other 
hand, the Bosnian Serbs were able to create a territory to ensure their autonomy, but only 
by the means of resettlement and in the shadow of ethnic cleansing. Most importantly, 
considering the realistic outcomes of the fighting, Dayton was forced to obey the 
territorial status quo on the ground. With the exception of the unification of Sarajevo 
under Federation control and the establishment of a corridor between the Federation and 
Gorazde, the Bosnian constitution, and the entity structure it enshrined, is a codification 
of the spoils of war. 
 Today, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
encompass 49 percent and 51 percent of the state territory respectively. The relationship 
between the entities and the central state lies at the heart of the Dayton constitutional 
system. The entities are separate from the state level institutions, but reserve all powers 
that are not explicitly granted to the central state, eighty percent of institutional authority 
in Bosnia by the account mentioned previously. The extension of considerable federal 
power to the hands of the entities illustrates the fourth consociational criteria, segmental 
autonomy, within the Bosnian system.  
 Dayton granted the entities a generous share of autonomy. Each entity possesses 
the institutions of president, parliament, and judiciary that operate largely in isolation of 
the central state. The most noteworthy autonomous ability is to conduct foreign policy 
																																																								
54 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 147. 
	 51	
with adjacent countries. In affect, this means that RS can form bilateral ties with Serbia 
and the Federation can form bilateral ties with Croatia. 55  Indeed, this is a particularly 
unique characteristic of Bosnia that is typically not present in federal systems. On the 
other hand, the entity autonomy is limited in that it cannot contradict the central state 
constitution and are subject to the decisions of the Constitutional Court. For example, the 
aforementioned ‘constituent people’s decision’ of the Constitutional Court required 
representative parity in institutions at the entity level too. Although the central state 
seldom flexes its muscles on domestic policy, it can pass, enforce, and interpret laws for 
the entities. If the central state is unable to step in to protect the Bosnian Constitution, the 
international community will check entity separatism in the spirit of protecting Dayton. 
This occurred in 2011 when Milorad Dodik, an influential Serb politician of the RS, was 
whipping up ethno-nationalism in support of a referendum to undermine central state 
institutions.56 In response to the crisis, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton met 
with Dodik to squash the referendum before it went out. Ashton was successful and the 
spirit of central state authority was restored. But ultimately, Dodik, the leader of a federal 
entity, should never have been granted an audience with a foreign power if Dayton 
functioned properly. This example illustrates the blurred autonomy the entity level 
possesses in Bosnia, unlike a typical case of federalism. 
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2.3.1 Republika Srpska: Territorial Autonomy 
 As mentioned prior, the Republika Srpska attempted to declare independence in 
the early stages of the Bosnian War. In result, the border between Republika Srpska and 
the rest of Bosnia (the Federation) became a very tangible and violent division over the 
next few years. The peace deal, Dayton, reunited RS with Bosnia, but could not dare go 
so far as erasing the autonomy of the Serb enclave. Since Dayton, there are countless 
examples of secessionist rhetoric used by Republika Srpska political elites. However, 
from a legal perspective, the calls for statehood are legally invalid. The president of 
Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, claims, “Serbs as a people have two homes, Serbia 
and Republika Srpska. RS has all the criteria of a state: territory, government, and a 
people. And these are the criteria from Montevideo.”57 As the author Merdzanovic lays 
out, the Montevideo Convention of 1933 outlaid three criteria for statehood that Dodik 
correctly names. While Dodik is correct in his claim for people and territory, he is 
mistaken in the third, government. Legal experts have interpreted the Montevideo 
Convention as prescribing a sovereign government. Since the Republika Srpska is clearly 
subject to the institutions of the central state by the Dayton accords, the government of 
RS does not meet the Montevideo standard for statehood. Milorad Dodik’s statement is 
inconsistent with the international law he cited; however, Dodik is engaging an 
uneducated audience. His words are less for the truth of the matter asserted, and more to 
incite Serb patriotism. He is playing the role of the nationalist, a very natural role of 
Balkan politicians. Political elites from the Republika Srpska, such as President Dodik, 
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still fire off claims for secession in the 2018 election campaign. Dayton is constructed on 
the consociational logic of allowing the Serb cleavage to remain autonomous in a 
territorial sense through the entity structure, but to this affect the elite collaboration 
envisioned is squandered by secessionist rhetoric.  
 The institutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of 
BiH are heavily influenced by the consociational ideology of fragmented power and 
parity of groups, but the Republika Srpska is not. The RS constitution is loaded with 
rhetoric demanding self-rule of the Serb cleavage. “Republika Srpska shall be the State of 
the Serb people and of all its citizens.”58 Author Bose describes the RS as having a “siege 
mentality” from its birth in the perils of implosion and civil war surrounded by enemies. 
Article 104 of the Republika Srpska Constitution was amended with encouragement from 
the international community from, “the defense and protection of the sovereignty and 
independence of Republika Srpska is the right and duty of all citizens,”59 to the right of 
merely defending their ‘territory’ and ‘constitutional order.’ Notably, the Republika 
Srpska firmly held onto the power of an autonomous standing army until 2006, more than 
decade since Dayton was enacted.60 This example further evidences the autonomous 
bunker mentality the RS entity possesses. This is precisely the circumstance 
consociational theory is equipped for. 
 The Republika Srpska echoes an age-old Serbian political tradition in the supreme 
standing of the parliament. The RS legislature is called the National Assembly, consisting 
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of eighty-three delegates in a single chamber representing the whole territory. Delegates 
are elected for four-year terms, and the chamber operates by majority vote.  In practical 
terms, the RS legislature is unicameral, but there is an ‘advisory body’ the Senate, of 55 
‘distinguished individuals from the public sector, the academic and the science sector, as 
well as the arts and culture sector.’61 The executive arm, the Government, consists of a 
Prime Minister, deputy minister, and numerous other ministers assigned a portfolio. The 
Government can be removed by a vote of no confidence by the National Assembly, thus 
are ‘responsible to the NA.’62 Furthermore, the President of the RS is elected directly by 
the citizens by a popular vote.63 The role of the President is not entirely symbolic, but 
also a player in the legislative procedure. The President nominates each of the Senate 
members. Furthermore, the president can chose to promulgate a law the NA passes, 
sending it back to the chamber to be voted on again. Of course, if passed for a second 
time, the law goes into effect.64 The President can also interfere in the executive process. 
With the support of 20 delegates of the NA, request the resignation of the Prime 
Minister.65 As for the judiciary, the RS has its own constitutional court deciding conflicts 
between the separate branches of entity government and intra level quarrels between the 
entity and the municipalities.  Additionally, there is a network of courts in RS with a 
Supreme Court sitting on the pinnacle.  
 Following this incredibly brief overview, we can determine the RS system 
resembles a Western parliament-dominated organism. This is further evidenced in the 
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140 articles in the RS Constitution that directly address the municipalities. Thus, the roles 
of the municipalities are ‘largely limited to implementation and administration’ and not a 
centre of ‘autonomous decision-making.’66 This illustrates the centralized nature of the 
aspiring government. In addition, the RS has its own television-broadcasting network and 
its own ‘National Bank’.67 To this affect, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s consociational 
structure engineered segmental autonomy through the physical and institutional 
separation of the Republika Srpska for the Serb cleavage within the context of 
consociational logic. 
 
2.3.2 The Federation: Integrated Autonomy 
 The international interventionists used the Washington Peace Deal to silence the 
Croats-Bosniaks front in 1994 with the intention of transitioning focus to Bosnian Serb 
aggression. Thus, the FBiH territory was a pragmatic creation in desperate times, rather 
than a thorough review of the delicate dynamic between the two groups. In March 1996, 
the President of the Federation, Croat Kresimir Zubak said, “We entered the project 
called the Federation under time pressure. The principles and goals of neither the one nor 
the other people were predefined or redefined. The Croats can accept the Federation, but 
the problem is that the Muslim (Bosniak) leadership did not accept the Federation as the 
ultimate model, but as a temporary solution in which one people dominates the other.”68 
Furthermore, Bozo Rajic, President of the dominant Croat nationalist party HDZ, spoke 
out in 1996 that, “Croats sacrifice that degree of autonomy that they would have in a 
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Republic of their own, and the Bosniaks sacrifice the concept of a unitary civic state.”69 
This illustrates how the two demographic cleavages of the Federation are innately in 
tension; Bosniaks want more centralization, the Croats fragmentation. This tension lies at 
the heart of the Federation construct. 
 While the autonomy of the Serb cleavage is afforded through the territorial 
structure of Dayton, the autonomy Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation of BiH is 
integrated into the cantonal structure. The canton is another layer of administrative 
institutions that are unique to the FBiH. There are ten of these cantons: five majority 
Bosniak, three Croat, and two mixed. Each canton possesses individual executive, 
judicial and legislative branches. While, RS rests supremacy in a unicameral parliament, 
the Federation must be more delicate to balance the autonomy of the cleavages Bosniak 
and Croat, thus the cantons possess the lion’s share of power. This is rooted in the fact 
that Croats are outnumbered in the FBiH. 2013 census numbers reveal there are 497,883 
Croats living in the FBiH, which is 22.4% of the population.70 However, Croats are given 
constitutional mandates by Dayton that entitles them to equal representation in most 
institutions with the 70.4% Bosniak population. Thus, the Croats have fought hard to 
capture enough cantonal-level power to ensure their autonomy is protected.  
 Part III of the Federation Constitution apportions power between the cantons and 
the entity levels, and it leaves much to be desired from the entity-level. The Federation 
itself is merely granted: making economic policy (meaningless), fiscal policy, inter-
cantonal crimes, combatting terrorism, allocating electronic frequencies, and making 
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energy policy.71 Excluding the last item, those powers are meek. However there is a 
concurrent list of responsibilities for the entity and cantons: health, human rights, 
environmental policy, infrastructure for transportation and communications, social 
welfare policy, tourism, and the use of natural resources. The constitution encourages, or 
rather services, the levels to work harmoniously, ‘the Cantons and the Federation 
Government shall consult one another on an ongoing basis with regard to these 
responsibilities; but, in execution, the cantons have taken most of these powers.  
 Lastly, the cantons are specifically granted the responsibility of police forces, 
education policy, cultural policy, housing policy, public services, local land use, 
regulating and promoting local businesses and charities, regulating availability of energy 
resources, policy concerning radio and television facilities, implementing social welfare 
policy, implementing Cantonal tourism policy, and financing everything with taxation or 
borrowing.72 Clearly, many of these responsibilities run parallel with the concurrent list; 
therefore, cantons have assumed the lion’s share of responsibility for them. Furthermore, 
cantons have absorbed the governing of energy resources, the one remaining prerogative 
of the entity level, due to the substantial hydroelectric resources in the territory.  
 In keeping with the strain of consociational logic from the central state 
configuration, the framers of the FBiH constitution enshrined the parity of three ethnic 
cleavages through quota mechanisms. The House of Peoples is the upper chamber of the 
Federation. It is composed of 58 delegates; 17 from each of the constituent peoples and 7 
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from the ‘Others.’73 Delegates of the House of Peoples are not elected by the voters, but 
nominated by the cantonal representatives. Each canton must send at least one delegate of 
each ethnic cleavage to the Federation House of Peoples. However, the Constitutional 
Court struck down this law in the recent case brought bought by the Croat leader Ljubic. 
The Federation, as of May 2018, is in a state of crisis without a method of electing the 
House of Peoples. This body nominates two-thirds of the central state House of Peoples, 
thus the entire Bosnian state is facing imminent shutdown. An extensive analysis of this 
impending situation is in chapter 5. Though, the primary takeaway is that the Croats, 
despite being the minority group in the Federation, have used triggered their segmental 
autonomy through a judicial mechanism. This demonstrates how consociational theory 
has been integrated into the structure of the Federation BiH despite possessing a 
heterogeneous populace. 
 
2.4 The Consociational Classroom 
 The consociational framework invoked by Dayton constructs a highly 
decentralized bureaucracy and complex framework of political accommodation as 
described in the following two sections. The complexity and decentralization is due to 
two factors: (1) innate consociational theory and (2) the internationals integrated in the 
framework.  
 First, complexity arises from consociational theory. As anti-majoritarian, this 
system requires the full participation and accommodation of all the minority groups. 
According to Lijphart, “past violence among the subcultures,” is a takeoff mechanism for 
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consociational theory, and this is certainly present in post-war Bosnia.74 So, Dayton 
decided that the collective interests of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (Muslims) would be 
protected. These protections are engrained in the structure of the Bosnian state. Richard 
Holbrook, the architect of Dayton, noted that the Dayton agreement was chiefly 
influenced by the front lines of the war. Thus, the agreement is not an ideal 
consociational application, but is rather limited to the realities of the post-conflict state. 
This generated a difficult balancing task amongst ethnic interests. 
 Second, complexity arises from the international community being engrained in 
the functionality of the state.  For example, Dayton asserts the supremacy of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights over 
all other law in Bosnia.75 Bosnian officials must provide unrestricted access to 
international human rights monitoring mechanisms including the United Nations and 
NATO, and any supervisory board that has approval by these two including IFOR 
(Implementation Force) and the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia). 
Additionally, Dayton restricts the Bosnian Parliament from amending the clause granting 
the international community unrestricted access.76 Consequently, Dayton has created 
legal dependence on the active role of the international community within the 
consociational structure.  This is the second root of complexity in the Bosnian system. 
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 Many scholars have blamed the dysfunction of Bosnia on the complexity of the 
first type, that ethno-nationalist parties do not agree because they are legally entitled to 
preventing majoritarian rule.   
In multiethnic Bosnia, where the Dayton accords have forced the Bosnian Serbs, 
Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims to live together in an artificial state, pluralism 
and democracy are going backward.77 
 In the words of the American journalist and three-time Pulitzer Prize winner, 
Thomas Friedman, systematic civil democratization is incompatible with societies deeply 
divided along ethnic lines. His argument illustrates the conventional viewpoint that 
societies deeply divided along ethnic lines are unsuitable for democracy.78 He reasons, 
that perhaps Bosnia would be better off divided into three states, each encompassing a 
different ethnic group. However, this stance undervalues the complexity of Bosnian 
divisions. The three ethnic groups lived relatively harmoniously for centuries; the 
differences between the groups were artificial creations of external forces, much more so 
than the artificial creation of the Bosnian state today. As Misha Glenny pointed out, the 
spillover of nationalism from Yugoslavia’s breakup cracked the centuries of Bosnian 
multi-ethnic coherence into pieces. Despite the divisions dug in the war, the Bosnian 
population remains too intermixed to suggest clean boundaries. The parties are already 
formed along ethnic lines. I believe the partition suggestion made by the Pulitzer winner 
would result in certain civil war. 
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 However, Arend Lijphart, the Dutch scholar who’s contributions made 
consociational theory one of the most renown approaches to comparative constitutional 
design in the 20th century, argued against this blanket pessimism. As the first chapter of 
this paper explained, Lijphart argued that institutionalizing segmental identities in a 
‘grand coalition’ of elite would allow the polity to cooperate where there is extremely 
limited coherence between isolated groups of citizens. The draftees of Dayton recognized 
the priority of consociational democracy to deliver stability as a compelling incentive to 
implement it in Bosnia. “Normative consociational theory is a theory of democratization 
intending to produce stable democratic rule.”79 This example highlights the crisis-
orientated potential of Lijphart’s theory, but also raises the question if this arrangement is 
capable of sustaining a polity under the conditions Bosnia has faced. 
 Lijphart never considered the international context of consociational design, but 
many scholars after him have deeply considered the topic. In the view of political 
philosopher Eldar Sarajlic, the relationship can be termed a, “convenient consociation,”80 
or rather, a convenient approach to consociational democracy from the viewpoint of the 
international community. By placing themselves as the mediators between the ethnic 
cleavages, the foreigners make themselves indispensible within the logic of social and 
political accommodation. Sarajlic warns that accommodation which is more cosmetic 
than functional falls short of Lijphart’s theory. In result, we ask if consociational theory 
can exist under the weight of international interference. According to Sarajlic, imposing 
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consensus on the segmental cleavages is not traditionally consociational. According to 
Lijphart, the social cleavages must discover the incentive to accommodate from the fear 
of disintegration and conflict.  
 On the other hand, international weight will not necessarily crush consociational 
logic. Gerhard Lehmbruch explains how consociational theory can be adapted to fit the 
international setting, “If, as a result of octroi or mediation (by international powers), 
consociational strategies are introduced and turn out to be advantageous for the interested 
parties, consociational norms of behavior may be internalized in the process of learning 
through success.”81 This example highlights how even though consociational theory may 
be imposed in its structure of institutions; internal consociationalism can be “learned.” In 
Lehmbruch’s view, this is the essence of Lijphart’s logic. The internal process of 
teaching consensus has largely been the mandate of the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR), an international institution crafted by Dayton. Therefore, the OHR should be 
teaching the Bosnian elite how accommodation is enticing in Lehmbruch’s terms. 
Through the pupil-guide relationship, Lehmbruch argues the consociational democracy 
can be internationally designed in contrast to Sarajlic’s argument. 
 Lehmbruch highlights how the regional pressures impact consociational 
democracies too. Due to the ethnic camaraderie between Serbia and Croatia for their 
Bosnian counterparts, this consideration is certainly pertinent for Bosnia. Along 
Lehmbruch’s logic, if Bosnian Croat elites are closer with, or influenced more by, the 
Bosnian Serb elites and Bosniak elites, rather than the homeland Croatian elites, then 
consociational theory will function as designed. However, if this is not the case, “If the 
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internal genetic conditions of consociational strategies are weakly developed, then the 
distance among the internal elites will tend to be larger, while the distance between the 
internal elites and the corresponding external elites will be smaller.”82 This example 
highlights how it might as well be the job of the international community to ensure 
homeland affinities do not breakdown consociational theory. But Lehmbruh says, under 
these conditions, partition may still not be a viable solution because either the ethnic 
groups are intermingled or because one or more of the parties will see partition as a zero-
sum game. Both are the case. The territory remains heterogeneous and the state 
centralization is engaged in a zero-sum game. Notice, any attempt to give Serbs or 
Croatians greater decentralization will negatively affect the Bosniak push for Bosnian 
state centralization. Therefore, under these conditions, Lehmbruch argues that 
consociational theory can and must be “learned” by the Bosnian elite. I add on that the 
consociational community could limit the influence of homeland politicians on the 
Bosnian microcosm. All in all, Bosnia should engage in an international consociational 
classroom in order to ensure the theory creates grand coalition accommodation. 
 Interestingly, another author has published on the topic this thesis seeks to 
address: the ironies of consociational government. Aaron Vlasak wrote that 
administration of forestry in Bosnia represents the problems with a highly fragmented 
and consociational design. 
In FBiH, the constitutional protection of local self-governance rights led to the 
disintegration of Federal forest law. There, forest administration is composed of 
many authorities on multiple layers, and the presumption of cooperation among 
them is principally a theoretical tenant of consociational democracy. Although 
there are statutory imperatives of cooperation, in action, interagency relations 																																																								
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more resemble reluctant coalescence or utter dissociation than cooperation. 
Postwar consociation in FBiH generally lacks the liberal value of compromise. 
This is a key irony of so-called “consociation”: political accommodation 
becomes a blockage to consensual politics, going forward.83 
While Vlasak aptly points out that complexity of administration plagues the system, he is 
mistaken to believe that creating “ad hoc implementation bodies” will remedy cross-
segmental accommodation. The true irony of consociationalism is the push to impose 
consociationalism, thereby departing from the ownership doctrine that is found in the 
classroom. The Bosnian elites need to be taught how to form consensus, not given the 
end product. This is not how learning works, and this represents the crux of the problem 
with consociationalism in Bosnia today. The next three chapters validate this specific 
claim. 
 
  
																																																								
83 Aaron Vlasak, “Ironies of Consociation: Forest and Natural Resource Governance 
in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Society & Natural Resources 31, no. 5 (2018): 
611, https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2017.1421281. 
	 65	
Chapter III – The Office of the High Representative 
3.1 In Good Faith 
 In 1993, ethnic war had consumed the region of Yugoslavia since the nations of 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia declared independence. All had been bloody, but none so 
much as the multi-ethnic Bosnia. Communities of Bosniaks (Muslim), Serbs and Croats 
were suddenly trapped in a land crawling with enemies, seeking to use any means to 
establish the authority of their ethno-nationalist group.  In March 1993, 60,000 mainly 
Bosniak refugees swelled into the little Bosnian town Srebrenica without sufficient 
materials of survival. United Nations commander Philippe Marillion was beckoned to the 
town from worldwide the cries for humanitarian aid. He replied, “You are now under the 
protection of the United Nations … I will never abandon you.”84 He was mistaken. In 
April, Bosnian Serb forces commanded by General Ratko Mladic surrounded the town of 
Srebrenica. The U.N. declared the city a safe zone, but Serb forces cut off the town of 
basic necessities for many months to force surrender. Then, tensions in Srebrenica 
escalated in 1995 as NATO bombed a nearby Serb munitions enclave. In response, a Serb 
assault took 400, mainly Dutch, U.N. peacekeepers hostage. This move gave room for the 
Serbs to bargain with the U.N., ultimately leading the U.N. relinquishing control of the 
thousands of refugees they had sworn to protect in Srebrenica. The Serb forces descended 
into the camps raping and killing at will. July 11, 1995, as international forces tried to 
regain protection for the refugees of Srebrenica, General Mladic corralled all the refugee 
males of military age and murdered them outright. 7,079 were killed in the Srebrenica 
massacre: the bloodiest day on European soil since World War II. In response, NATO 
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Operation Deliberate Force dropped over a thousand bombs on Serbian forces, crippling 
their military and forcing them to the negotiating table by the end of summer. Peace was 
finally secured; there is no doubt the NATO campaign led by the United States saved 
thousands from perishing like those at Srebrenica. 
 Considering the bloody context of Bosnia, the United States’ aim of intervention 
is justified. Morally, the sheer number of innocent deaths at the heart of Europe was a 
calamity. Politically, the Clinton Administration was brought under immense pressure 
after two years of standing by. Strategically, the viability of NATO was on the line. Ivo 
H. Daalder concludes there are five principle reasons the United States decided in August 
1995, after watching the Bosnian conflict for well over two years, to engage in 
intervention, “The expected collapse of UNPROFOR following the humiliation of the 
hostage crisis; the threat Bosnia posed to the vitality, if not continued vitality, of NATO; 
the prospect of having to deploy U.S. troops to rescue UN forces and sustain the 
alliance’s credibility; and congressional pressure to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. 
Undergirding all of these was the president’s reelection campaign, then only months 
away.”85 The U.S. and its allies set an artificial twelve-month deadline for the removal of 
troops from the country. Ivo Daalder, the key strategist of U.S. policy in Bosnia, 
emphasized that President Clinton, learning from experience in Somalia and Haiti, 
wanted a concise “exit strategy.”86 However, once the American agenda of ending of the 
war was in reach, it quickly became a much harder issue of creating lasting peace in 
Bosnia. The United States and Western Allies secured peace on the European continent 
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through force then brought the leaders of the warring factions to Dayton, Ohio to ensure 
this catastrophe would not be repeated. The Dayton Peace Agreement was an 
accomplishment for global peace and enshrined Bosnia’s commitment to democracy. But, 
peace negotiations did not follow the traditional course of waiting for a solution for the 
political conflict to ripen; “Dayton differed from this traditional negotiating method by 
substituting American leadership and bluster for the parties’ commitment to search for a 
negotiated solution.” Therefore, Dayton became more an imposition than an agreement. 
Thus, the reality of creating sustainable peace in Bosnia proved to be much more difficult 
than perhaps the United States imagined. 
 Dayton’s Annex IV is the portion of the agreement that outlined the constitutional 
structure of Bosnia agreeing with the four tiers of consociationalism. Additionally, 
Dayton is laden with language that evokes the arbitration of the international community 
in the state-building process. This includes: Annex II granting IFOR (backed by NATO) 
the mandate to rule the irksome Brcko district; Annex III endorsing the OSCE with 
expediting free and fair elections; and Annex VII giving unrestricted access to the 
UNHCR, UNDP, and International Committee of the Red Cross (IRCR) for return of 
refugees and humanitarian aid. Measures such as these allowed the Western powers to 
play an active role in planting democracy into the highly divided Bosnian soil. While the 
international involvement is extensive, the rationale and implementation of these external 
measures were done in good faith. However, even acting in good faith one can become 
carried away. No Dayton provision would lay the foundation for such excessive 
international power as Annex X, the formation of the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR). 
	 68	
 Annex X is titled: “Agreement on Civilian Implementation,” meaning that this 
institution is responsible for the non-military affairs of international intervention 
specifically refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction, and the establishment of 
political institutions.87 The nations who participated in the Dayton Accords created the 
OHR to protect their stake in the intervention. 
The High Representative is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for 
integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. The OHR is working towards the point 
where Bosnia and Herzegovina is able to take full responsibility for its own 
affairs.88 
 
 As this example demonstrates, the High Representative is the diplomatic guardian 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement from a global and local perspective. Dayton ensures that 
progress reports are published to the United Nations, European Union, United States, 
Russian Federation, and any other interested governments.89 Furthermore, the High 
Representative convenes a “Joint Civilian Commission” of various BiH political elite at 
any level of government. This hereby entails that the OHR possesses the responsibility to 
create consensus among the three ethnic cleavages within the consociational incentive 
structure. Consociational democracy, explained in detail in the Chapter I of the thesis, 
relies upon the accommodation political elites across the social divisions of the citizens. 
The task of safeguarding consociational Dayton by fostering multiethnic cooperation has 
proven to be the ultimate challenge of every High Representative over the past two 																																																								
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decades. All seven High Representatives have taken different approaches to this mandate 
as the Bosnia evolved over the past twenty years; however, the key problem is always the 
same. External pressure to crosscut social cleavages is not necessary to ensuring a stable 
democratic state. 
 The Dayton Peace Agreement established a group of nations called the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) to oversee democratization process in Bosnia. The PIC 
comprises of fifty-five nations and agencies that provide financial support, troops, or 
direct operations on the ground in Bosnia.90 From the first meeting in London, the Peace 
Implementation Conference established the Steering Board to work as the executive 
representative of the diplomatic body. The Steering Board includes: U.S., Canada, Japan, 
Italy, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Russia, the presidency of the E.U., the 
European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by 
Turkey. This collection of substantial global power guides the aims of the international 
agency, the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR is the external agency 
tangibly in Bosnia influencing the political elite directly. Formed (in 1995) as a 
temporary monitor and implementer of democratization in Bosnia, the OHR carries the 
burden of maintaining compliance with the Dayton agreement. In other words, the OHR 
is needed to make sure the international intervention for lasting peace does not turn out a 
bust.91  
 To this end, Dayton outlays the functions of the OHR, “Maintain close contact 
with the Parties to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace 
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settlement and a high level of cooperation between them and the organizations and 
agencies participating in those aspects.”92 This example illustrates an important nuance of 
consociational thought. Dayton directly addresses the parties of Bosnia, implying that the 
subjects of Dayton are not as much the Bosnian citizens, but rather the nationalist 
ideologies the parties represent. In the wake of the war, this is an intentional and essential 
property of consociational theory. Rampant ethno-nationalism was the tiger that brought 
the country to war; thus it is vital that Dayton addresses the cleavages plainly. The OHR 
is responsible to ensure each of the ethno-cleavages would cooperate with the peace, 
meaning that the Bosnian constitutional structure engineered in Annex 4 of Dayton came 
to fruition.  All in all, the OHR was tasked with the very mission of guaranteeing 
consociational theory did not fail by addressing the nationalist parties directly. 
 
3.2 The First Elections of 1996 
 High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch (1999-2002) recognized that while 
consociational theory depends on an ‘elite cartel’ to bridge the gaps between the social 
cleavages, the Bosnian elite from the war needed to be exchanged for a new generation 
that was sincerely capable of compromise. However, due to the pragmatism of creating 
peace, Dayton kept the nationalist elite in power. The clinging existence of the political 
elite that dragged Bosnia into the nationalist war did not hold a compelling promise of 
reconciliation, but this elite held the power to stop the fighting – the first priority of the 
Clinton Administration in Bosnian intervention. Recall from the previous chapter how 
Dayton specifically addressed the parties that represent the sides of the war rather than 
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the citizens of Bosnia themselves. High Representative Petritsch conceded that while the 
nationalist parties make it inconvenient to find multi-ethnic agreement, the nationalist 
elites were the ones in charge of the war in Bosnia, and any serious attempt to make 
peace in Bosnia needed to go through them. 
If you ask me to choose between having an elite, and it was inevitably the same 
elite around from the war, or having a charge of people unconnected to the war 
but less elite in their experience, I’d chose the second. [But when we go into a 
country]...we, the international community, do an immediate deal with the people 
in charge because it makes it easier for us to run the country-and, by the way, 
solves the problem of legitimacy as well. But what [you] do then is you buy in 
the very people who brought the war. In almost all cases they are the corrupt 
people because that's what wars produce...So we do the easy deal, the quick 
deal.93   
— Paddy Ashdown, High Representative (2002-2006) 
 
 On January 10, 2018, I met with a pair of electoral lawyers at the Office of the 
High Representative in Sarajevo. One of the individuals commented that the greatest 
blunder the International Community made in Bosnia was to allow the wartime blocs to 
remain in power in 1996 following the signing of Dayton. While the foreign diplomats 
sought to reconcile ethnic hate with a free election in 1996, the result was an 
entrenchment of the ethno-nationalist cleavages that started the war without sufficient 
time for the opposition to campaign. The three nationalist parties that won the elections in 
1996 almost uniformly represented the three wartime blocs. The traditional nationalist 
parties are SDA (Bosniaks), HDZ (Croats), and SDS (Serbs). These winning parties 
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structured themselves into three cleavages that captured much of the wealth of the state 
by taking control of public institutions.  
 The OHR representative I interviewed thought that maybe Bosnia could have 
been better declared a protectorate state, like Kosovo. This would enrich the political soil 
before holding elections he argued. Yet, creating a protectorate was rejected since it 
meant investing significantly more resources into the country. Regardless, the 
contemporary OHR representative advocated that allowing ethno-nationalism that killed 
Yugoslavia to seep into the Dayton structure in 1996 is the key problem in Bosnia still 
today. However, my OHR interviewee failed to recognize the essence of their 
institutional consociational mandate as described in Dayton: 
Maintain close contact with the Parties to promote their full compliance with all 
civilian aspects of the peace settlement and a high level of cooperation between 
them and the organizations and agencies participating in those aspects.94 
 
This is the language of the Dayton treaty forming the OHR’s official mandate. This 
legal articulation demonstrates the OHR is tasked with facilitating consensus 
amongst the cleavages as prescribed by consociational theory. Recall, the elite 
incentive structure provides that while the cleavages may antagonize each other, 
ultimately the incentive to compromise would win out under mutually 
advantageous conditions. Simply put, the OHR is employed with keeping an eye on 
this incentive structure on behalf of the international community. This role is 
compatible with Gerhard Lehmbruch’s adaptation of consociational theory in the 
international context. In his view, the international force can act as a teacher of 
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consociational logic in order for the theory to be ‘learned’ or internalized. 
Consequently, the OHR would be given expansive power to serve this mandate. 
 
3.3 The Bonn Powers 
 As the previous quotation from High Representative Petritsch denotes, the strong 
nationalist foundation from the 1996 elections did not make the OHR job as the facilitator 
of consensus any easier. Carl Bildt (1996-1997) was the first of seven to hold the High 
Representative post. He had previously been Sweden’s Prime Minister and facilitated 
Sweden’s ascension to the E.U. When he arrived in Sarajevo, Bosnia’s capital, under the 
mandate of the Steering Board nations, he was left to sleep on the floor of the Swedish 
Ambassador’s quarters. The PIC left the OHR underfunded and poorly organized; but 
Bildt was dedicated to building an the institution from the ground up. The Joint Interim 
Commission (JIC) was the first attempt in Bosnia to bring international and elite 
collaboration in tune with the Dayton model.95 This meeting was intended to discuss all 
issues of Dayton’s framework for the central state or inter-entity relations. Quickly, the 
first High Representative, Carl Bildt, discovered consociational consensus would be 
difficult to generate. 
“My problem in all of these meetings is that I did not have much leverage against 
either of them. I had the moral authority of the international community, but 
moral authority alone did not cut much ice in the hard political game over the 
future of Bosnia.”96  
— Carl Bildt, High Representative (1996-1997) 																																																									
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In the first six months of Bildt’s tenure, there were no agreements across ethnic cleavages 
without the intense pressure of high-level international officials. The removal of Serb war 
leader, Karadzic, and the chaotic events in Mostar are two such examples where the OHR 
was incapable of the consociational mandate to initiate the ‘grand coalition’ Lijphart 
prescribes for stability. However, Lijphart emphasizes, “the length of time a 
consociational democracy has been in operation is also a factor of importance.”97 
Consociational norms become more firmly established as inter-elite cooperation becomes 
habitual and does not represent a stark departure from competitive Bosnian divisions.  
 However, the OHR did not wait patiently. The Sarajevo Agreement in March 
1996 established harsh penalties for Dayton-reluctant local elites by revoking financial 
support for cantons unable to form governments in a respective timeframe and for 
municipalities that blocked refugee return. This marks the initial swing of the OHR into 
the local foray of Bosnian politics. The analogy of a pendulum is fitting for the OHR’s 
role in Dayton Bosnia. The OHR began with little real power, then would swing into a 
role that exceeded its purpose vested by Dayton, and finally would swing back to near 
impotency. Bildt’s term can be viewed as the pendulum’s release and beginning the 
swing motion into active imposition. 
When I completed my assignment in 1997 and handed [it] over to my successor, 
the Office of HR was seen no longer as something to be limited, representing a 
threat to the primacy of the military efforts, but instead, as the very key to the 
success of the overall peace implementation... particularly important has been 
shifts to restrict the mandate of the high representative to efforts to strengthen 
it.98  
— Carl Bildt, High Representative (1996-1997) 																																																								
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In December 1997, the Steering Board determined that the limited capabilities of 
the OHR needed to be expanded in order for democracy to take root. In the German town 
of Bonn, the PIC convened to expand Annex X of Dayton giving the High Representative 
full authority to bypass the Bosnian legal system foisted by Dayton. This authority would 
come to be known as the Bonn Powers. They gave the OHR the competency to tamper 
with two daunting strings: (1) to pass laws without any justification or checks from the 
locals and (2) to remove elected officials from office without democratic inhibitions. In 
many ways, the Bonn Powers were justifiable. The international community had tasked a 
rather powerless mediator with only threats of economic sanction and politicians’ travel 
restrictions to induce cooperation.99 The OHR was part of a larger project to transition 
Bosnia from a war-torn, divided country into a modern and efficient state. So the Bonn 
Powers became an instrument of breaking blockades and helping state building occur 
quicker. However, the problem with the Bonn Powers lay less in why they were first 
implemented, and more in the unintended consequences. 
 It was midway through the administration of the second high representative, 
Carlos Westendorp (1997-1999), that the aforementioned Bonn Powers were infamously 
crafted and first brandished.  
At the Bonn conference, we managed to introduce a method by which the High 
Representative can take these decisions, which is not exactly in legal terms with 
Dayton. It was not very legal, I have to admit; but I have to confess that 
everybody accepted it. Nobody protested. Why? Because they [i.e. the members 
of the international community] knew that all these things [i.e. the 
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implementation of laws] were necessary but they [i.e. Bosnian parties] were not 
able to accept [the proposed laws] by definition, you know.100 
— Carlos Westendorp, High Representative (1997-1999) 
 
 For many years, the Bosnian political elite could not break the deadlock on 
citizenship law. Since citizenship was viewed as a fundamental state-building issue with 
no path through the impasse in sight, it was the first slected to get Bonn treatment. 
Without a word of justifying rationale, HR Westendorp, with the stroke of the pen, signed 
a version of citizenship policy into conclusive law, thereby solving the deadlock. 
In accordance with my authority under Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and 
Article XI of the Bonn Document, I do hereby decide that the Law on Citizenship 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enter into force by 1 January 1998 on interim 
basis, until the Parliamentary Assembly adopts this law in due form, without 
amendments and no conditions attached...The Peace process is, after Sintra and 
Bonn, entering a new and decisive phase. I am decided to fully use my authorities 
under annex 10 of the Dayton peace Accord and Article 11 of the Bonn 
Document to insure an efficient implementation and fully count on your fully co-
operation in this endeavor.101 
 
High Representative Westendorp and the PIC that backed him understood the Bonn 
Powers as a means of accelerating the progress of fundamental state building. While this 
was not ideal, they agreed that Bosnia needed to be forced to make progress. Westendorp 
bemoaned the elites for not agreeing on a flag, national anthem, currency, or any unifying 
symbols of a standard country. So the OHR would use Bonn Powers to achieve results on 
all of these issues stuck in gridlock. Accommodation was not learned, it was imposed.  
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3.4 The Scapegoat-Dependency Cycle  
 Consociationalism allows the political elites to breathe nationalist fire during 
election cycles in the Bosnia. Lijphart anticipated this return to the centrifugal forces in 
plural societies. However, the elites are supposed to return to the consensus table after 
elections in order to keep their positions. If the political elites do not broker deals, then 
society suffers the consequences and votes out the politicians in the next electoral cycle. 
Since the internationals have not allowed the politicians to let down their constituents by 
using Bonn Powers, then cross-cleavage compromise does not possess an incentive for 
the elites. This section will demonstrate how OHR blocks the incentive structure of 
consociationalism.  
The elite scapegoat the OHR for the Bonn Powers; yet, ironically, depend on this 
scapegoating function to win elections. In the words of Arend Lijphart, “external 
threats... appear to be strongly conducive to the establishment or maintenance of 
cooperation among elites in a fragmented system.”102 Thus, the strongest incentive for the 
social cleavages in a consociational structure to unite is in the face of a common ‘external 
threat.’ If the nationalist parties of Bosnia successfully portray the OHR as an external 
threat they are more likely to find consensus than through any diplomatic efforts of the 
OHR.  This is the inherent irony of the OHR’s active role in a consociational structure – 
the more help it tries to provide, the more hostile the cleavages are permitted to act. 
 Westendorp believed in the limitations of the Bonn Powers as to not have the 
system fall into habitual dependency on the OHR. “Of course, I knew that it was only a 
temporary measure. It shouldn’t be forever, because otherwise it creates habit. This is the 
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dependency syndrome, as they call it.”103 As Adis Merdzanovic, political scientist and 
author of Democracy by Decree, rightly points out this unhealthy dependency on external 
intervention is exactly what happened, and consequently the local elite were abdicated 
from their duty to form the grand coalition prescribed by Lijphart’s theory. ‘Imposed 
consociationalism’ is the term coined by Merdzanovic. He tediously outlays the 
international involvement in Bosnia since Dayton and the consequence of active political 
interference on consociational democracy. The ‘dependency syndrome’ reverses the 
positive incentive structure for politicians to accommodate once elected. Inter-elite 
consensus, which is necessary for self-sufficient stabilization in consociational theory, is, 
thus, unable to materialize. Rather than coming together, elites out-nationalize each other, 
scapegoating the OHR for coercing compromise. This chapter will validate 
Merdzanovic’s claim that the OHR abdicated the incentive of elites to form consensus, 
but takes another step. An external force imposed on Bosnia, especially the Bonn Powers, 
has long-term negative effects on the consociational system. 
 HR Petritsch echoed his predecessor that the ‘dependency syndrome’ must be 
temporary and avoided at all costs, but in truth he caused more dependency. Petritsch 
went to the Wall Street Journal to squabble with an international audience over the 
detrimental consequences Bonn Powers had on the consociational arrangement. 
At heart, the leaders of the three ethnic groups – Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats – know 
what needs to be done to secure a future for their country. But our presence here 
has inadvertently absolved them of their responsibilities as democratically 
elected leaders. We enable the politicians to fight their tribalistic battles, and then 
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to place the blame for potentially unpopular compromises squarely on the 
shoulders of foreigners. I call this ‘dependency syndrome.’104 
-Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative (1999-2002) 
 This statement defines two parts of the dependency syndrome. First, the 
politicians are capable of, but chose otherwise, to engage in accommodation. This is due 
to their anticipation that the OHR will impose accommodation regardless of their 
positions. Second, the decision by the elites to withhold the token of their consensus is 
more strategic because if this compromising measure becomes unpopular with their 
ethnic group, then the elite (in choosing to let the OHR impose consensus) can scapegoat 
foreign imposition. Without a track record, the elites dodge accountability.  
However, what Petritsch does not realize, is that the course of scapegoating will 
inevitably be a course of anti-Dayton nationalism. Centrifugal forces are inherent in 
plural societies, and only counteracted by the accommodation structure of consociational 
theory. Without it, the elites will drive election rhetoric non-stop. This is especially 
inherent in the Croat and Serb camps, because these groups lean toward the 
fragmentation of Bosnia, contrary to the OHR’s mission of bringing integration. 
Therefore, despite Petritsch and Westendorp being aware of the ‘dependency syndrome,’ 
both issued increasingly more Bond decisions each year thereby guaranteeing that 
nationalism did not go away.  
 To exemplify the ironic cycle of scapegoat dependency let us examine theme of 
OHR dismissals. In the first decision of this kind, Westendorp removed Pero Raguz, the 
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mayor of the Southern Herzegovinian town of Stolac.105 This dismissal was the first of 
many under the rationale of noncooperation with refugee return. This merits an essential 
state-building measure, due to local elite attempting to hold wartime gains. Furthermore, 
refugee return falls under the humanitarian legal jurisdiction of international institutions 
in Dayton. However, the case of Stolac represents one of the countless attempts at 
electoral engineering. Croat refugees in Germany and Central Bosnia were encouraged by 
HDZ (Croat nationalist party elite) to resettle in strategic areas, including in former 
Bosniak houses in Stolac.106 The Serb elite, SDS, did the same, relocating some 60,000 
displaced Serbs from the suburbs of Sarajevo to the Republika Srpska by force. The SDS 
did not even register in the Federation BiH elections in 1997, despite thousands of Serbs 
living there. Thirdly, the SDA took advantage of the influx of Bosniak refugees into the 
Federation BiH to relocate them to Sanski Most so that Serb resettlement would be 
exceedingly difficult. All in all, this depicts a nightmare situation for the OHR engaged in 
state building procedures. Hundreds of OHR dismissals would come over the next few 
years primarily due to obstruction of refugee resettlement and non-cooperation with the 
ICTY. HR Petritsch fired 21 officials on a single day in November of 1999, breaking the 
previous record of Westendorp of 16 earlier that year. The dismissed officials had no 
legal recourse for appeal of OHR decisions until 2005, when a rehabilitation policy was 
finally enacted. But by then, the damage had already been done. 
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 While the United States espouses the rule of law and rules-based world order, the 
OHR was blatantly circumventing this standard in Bosnia. HR Westendorp himself 
described the Bonn powers as ‘not very legal.’107 The OHR claims that its extensive 
authority is vested in Dayton, Annex X, Article V: Final Authority to Interpret and 
Article II (d): Facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of 
any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation.108 Yet, clearly the 
OHR is subject to and limited by international law, which in this case is the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31: “The general rule of interpretation.” The 
VCLT is applicable because Dayton is ‘a treaty between states’ in the sense of Article 1 
of VCLT and Article 31 VCLT is customary international law. Article 31 declares that 
the OHR is bound to interpret Dayton in ‘good faith,’ and Dayton Annex IV (The 
Bosnian Constitution) Article I (2) espouses rule of law as an important democratic 
principle. Therefore, the Bonn power of dismissal without due process can be seen as a 
crude infringement on rule of law. The nationalist elite latched onto this contradiction 
with far-reaching effects that have continued to leave a bad taste in the mouths of 
Bosnian citizens, regardless of their ethnic identification. 
  Nonetheless, the dismissals continued en masse. The pendulum would reach the 
apex of its swing with HR Ashdown. He was the most interventionist High 
Representative, issuing a grand total of 307 decisions invoking Bonn Powers. This is an 
average of ten decisions per month, prying his foreign fingers into defense, police, 
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education, and taxation reform. Ashdown reinvented ‘political responsibility’ with the 
2002 dismissal of the FBiH finance minister for involvement in a procurement scandal. 
The rationale for removing an individual from office was no longer limited to anti-
Dayton tendencies, but the abuse of public office became the jurisdiction of the 
international imposition. Despite supporters of HR Ashdown’s removals claiming that the 
intervention was conducive to greater transparency and accountability in the public 
sector, it is inescapable that there was no legal recourse for Bosnians to take against his 
decisions. Essentially, a parallel system had been forged outside of the rule of law 
inscribed in Dayton. The international powers, through the OHR, undermined the very 
Bosnian government they had pieced together in Dayton, Ohio. 
 
3.5 The OHR as a Politician 
  While HR Petritsch perceived Bonn Powers as kicking in when Dayton fails, HR 
Ashdown, his successor, saw them as an integrated part of the structure. In an address to 
the BiH Parliament, HR Ashdown called upon the local elite to find pragmatic consensus, 
even threatening them if they fail to do so. 
So the choice is not whether to reform. But how fast, how soon and, above all, 
who will drive the process of reform – you or me? Donors and investors don’t 
think High Representative impositions are a sustainable way to build a country in 
the long term. Increasingly their assistance to this country will be conditioned on 
BiH institutions passing and implementing reforms themselves. I will act if I 
have to. But let’s be clear. Every time I have to use my powers, it represents a 
failure of the system – your system. My job is to get rid of my job. But the pace 
at which that happens will be decided not by me, not by the international 
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community, but by you. The more you reform, the less I will have to. The less 
you reform, the more I will have to. So, like I say, it is up to you.109  
-Paddy Ashdown, High Representative (2002-2006) 
 
This example demonstrates that Ashdown thought the Dayton structure was flawed and 
Bonn Powers necessary for progress in state building. However this circumvents the logic 
of consociational theory along the same dependency-scapegoat cycle once again. By 
doing more consensus building, Ashdown was really doing less.  
 Consider if the majority of Bosnian citizens view a Bonn power decision 
favorably. Then, politics is functioning according to the people’s will. However, the 
‘grand coalition’ is not able to form self-sufficiently, thus stability is dependent on the 
OHR. While a popular OHR imposition might have worked as a quick fix in 2002, in 
2018 the Bosnian structure is suffering. HR Ashdown, former speaker of the British 
Parliament, avoided public backlash against his highly interventionist doctrine due to 
personal charisma. When reflecting on his stint as HR he wrote, “so, the crucial 
battlefield I had to win on was the battlefield of public opinion.”110 This example 
highlights how Ashdown operated like a politician clearly casting the OHR as an active 
character in the political scene of post-war Bosnia. Ashdown even called himself the 
‘public servant of Bosnia’ in his inaugural speech. Issuing an emblazoned path toward 
creating a common identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina with himself as a key 
representative.  If he wanted to sidestep elected officials with any strain of democratic 
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legitimacy, he reckoned public consent could warrant his decisions. To his credit, a 2003 
opinion poll found his approval rating in the ninety percentile while most of the local 
political elites were in the single digits.111 However, this exemplifies an unnerving 
approach High Representative Ashdown brought to Bosnia. Ultimately, like those before 
him, Ashdown’s approach failed to transition ownership and responsibility to the local 
Bosnian leadership as Dayton foresaw. When Ashdown left office, exceptional absolute 
progress had been made, but little real progress had occurred. Rather, an aesthetic of 
national unity was produced in concert with the American agenda of pulling attention and 
resources out of Bosnia and into the Iraqi invasion.  
 Furthermore, if the High Representative is mandated to ‘behave as a politician,’ as 
Ashdown did, then the international arbitrator is thrust into political competition with the 
local elites. Since HR Ashdown possessed the power to implement what he publically 
promised (thanks to the Bonn Powers) while his competition (the local elite) was 
shackled by consociational mechanisms of tripartite consensus, Ashdown stood head and 
shoulders above the Bosnian political field. For some time, Ashdown’s interventionism 
cast the OHR as indispensible in the perception of the public. Operating in the pseudo-
sincerity of public approval, Ashdown managed to structurally link Bosnian institutions 
(the political elite) with the OHR. This is the premise of Eldar Sarajlic’s argument of 
‘convenient consociation,’ or rather, a consociational democracy that relies on direct 
interaction between internationals and local elites, naturally making progress from an 
outsider’s perspective more convenient.112 Therefore, the Dayton incentive structure for a 
																																																								
111 Merdzanovic, Democracy By Decree, 299. 
112 Sarajlic, “The Convenient Consociation,” 61-80. 
	 85	
‘grand coalition’ is, more or less, fabricated. The elites will work with the international 
institutions as it serves their electoral interests. However, when things turn messy and 
voter support dissipates, the international officials keep their jobs, but the local politicians 
are immediately dead in the water for selling out their group to the imposition. It makes 
more sense to stick with nationalist side, allow the OHR to do state building, and criticize 
them with nationalist sentiment.  
 
3.6 The 2006 April Package  
 Mislead by the cosmetic returns of Ashdown’s tenure, the international 
community sought to close down the OHR by 2006. Consequently, Christian Scarz-
Shilling agreed to take the job as the final High Representative with the condition that 
progress on the ground matched international assessment.113  However, this condition 
could not be fulfilled. The OHR had made progress on paper, but Bosnian state building 
was overtly behind schedule. HR Shwarz-Shilling recognized politicians were still 
irresponsible public servants and Bosnia was incapable of functioning without the OHR 
because of the ‘dependency syndrome’ Petritsch described years prior. Unlike Petritsch 
and Ashdown, Shwarz-Shilling chose to step back from the limelight role, opting for less 
dependency and more local ownership. Consequently, his tenure represents the beginning 
of the swinging back of the pendulum in our analogy for OHR interventionism. He aimed 
at halting the incursion of dependency on his very first day in office, “elections are the 
crowning moment in any democracy.  It is not the selection of the new High 
Representative but the choices of the voters of this country that will determine how this 
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country will be governed.”114 A few months later he reiterated his faith in the Bosnian 
people and his departure from a heavy Bonn Powers approach. 
 I have made it clear that I will use the Bonn Powers without hesitation should 
this be necessary to maintain peace and stability or to further BiH’s cooperation 
with the ICTY. I have made it equally clear that I will not use the Bonn Powers 
for anything else. Let me take this opportunity to reiterate this commitment. The 
days when OHR micromanaged the political process in BiH by using – or simply 
by threatening to use – the Bonn Powers are over. This causes some people – in 
the International Community but also in the BiH political establishment – to 
throw up their hands in horror. Well, change is often challenging. And we are 
entering challenging times.115 
 
 The transition away from the Bonn Powers would not be as decisive as Schwarz-
Shilling alleged; the pendulum would take time to swing back. At this point, the OHR 
was conscious the United States was anxious to step out of the region.  With explosive 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration was keen to wrap up 
Bosnia as a success story. Consequently, the 2006 April Package was an attempt by the 
Americans to constitutionally restructure Dayton (for the first time) before permanently 
exiting the Bosnian scene.116 The Americans came close to obtaining consensus for the 
April Package, but Schwarz-Shilling refused to impose the final push. In the wake of 
failure, the general elections months later showed the true colors of the Bosnian political 
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elite – vivid nationalism. The victors of this election were the few politicians that stood 
against the April package and vehemently attacked the international community.  
 Under immense pressure of the international community, the Bosnian political 
elite signed a declaration of intent for constitutional reform in 2005 at the tenth 
anniversary of Dayton.117 More efficient legislative structures, mechanisms to prevent 
deadlocks, introduction of local self-government following European principle, and 
reform of sections of the Bosnian Constitution118 that contradicted the European 
Convention For Human Rights were all aims of the international (particularly American) 
agenda. The negotiations began with the eight dominant BiH parties present: SDA, HDZ 
BiH, SDS, HNZ, PDP, SBiH, SNSD, and SDP. The negotiations split into two 
antagonistic models for the Bosnian state in response to the age-old question of stateness. 
This question lies at the crux of political tension between the ethnic cleavages in Bosnia: 
whether sovereignty began with 1992 international recognition of Bosnian independence; 
or, whether sovereignty began with the signing of Dayton in Paris in late 1995. Bosniaks 
claim the former, emphasizing the unity of the original Bosnia and Herzegovinian state. 
Serbs claim the latter with Dayton institutionalizing the entity model. Then, there are the 
Croats. Being at odds with Bosniak centralization or an entity model that places them in 
an unhappy marriage with the Bosniaks in the Federation, Croats were sidelined by the 
Americans in their claims for greater federalism and local power. Moreover, many Croat 
politicians, under the leadership of Bozo Ljubic, broke away from HDZ because of the 
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April Package. On the other hand, Haris Silajdzic, founder and leader of SBiH, a Bosniak 
nationalist party, also walked away from the negotiations. Once it became clear that the 
entity mechanisms would be maintained, Siljdzic pulled out with harsh words, “such an 
arrangement is an embargo on the democratic future of Bosnia. It is also an embargo on 
truth regarding the past, for [it] presents the undeniable legitimization of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing.”119 This example highlights the severe tension over the Bosnian origin 
of statehood. Siljdzic believed that Bosnian statehood stemmed from before the war and 
the horrors of ethnic cleansing. Recall the Srebrenica tragedy described in the beginning 
of this chapter. 
 The final version of the constitutional package (1) legalized the OHR decisions to 
centralize defense and security, (2) increased the quantity of representatives in the state 
House of Representatives maintaining the entity mechanisms, and (3) the tri-presidency 
would be elected by the House of Representatives.120 Believing that the negotiations had 
prevailed, a SDP (Serb) politician told the US ambassador that, “this [April Package] is 
an agreement between us in BiH, without any interference from the OHR or international 
community.” As ironic as this statement is, it illustrates the genuine sense of satisfaction 
amongst the political elite that had finally reached consensus. The politicians wanted to 
believe their country was self-sufficient and the citizens believed they were capable of 
making decisions. 
 With the combined resistance of SBiH Bosniaks, five HDZ Croats, and a few 
rogue individuals, the April reform package failed by one vote to pass in the House of 
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Representatives with 26 in favor and 16 against. Despite how close the elite were to 
formal consensus, HR Christian Schwarz-Shilling remained committed to the 
‘ownership’ doctrine. To his credit, he refused to use Bonn powers to fabricate 
consensus. The failure was a setback from the American perspective, but the full extent 
of this failure showed itself a few months later in the October general elections.  
 The split Croat HDZ party, the rift between Bosniak SBiH and SDA, and the Serb 
division between SNSD and SDP resulted in 2006 being one of the most volatile election 
cycles in Bosnia’s history. Facing internal competition within an already multi-national 
front resulted in the universal strategy of candidates to out-nationalize one another. 
Milorad Dodik won the Republika Srpska Presidency by galvanizing calls for secession. 
Meanwhile, Siljdzic, who walked out of the April Package negotiations, renewed his 
bombardments on the Republika Srpska as a creation by genocide. But, most 
significantly, the Croat elite was split in two for the first time. In the BiH Presidential 
election, the Croat nationalist parties HDZ and HDZ 1990 received 26.1 and 18.2 percent 
of the vote respectively for their candidate. However, Zeljko Komsic won the Croat seat 
of the BiH Presidency with 40.0 % of the vote. Both HDZ and HDZ 1990 fumed that this 
candidate was elected by Bosniaks, and did not represent the Croat identity. This issue is 
called the Croat Question and has been the thorn in the side of Dayton, forcing the 
shutdown of the Federation in the early months of 2018. 
 The American framers of the April Package could not foresee the detrimental 
consequences of their actions, but this example illustrates how the political elite reacts to 
consensus imposition. Whether issued by the OHR, UN, EU, or American ambassador, 
any attempt to impose reform on Bosnia has been met with harsh criticism in the 
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following election cycle. In a functional consociational system, Bosnian elections would 
see a return of the elites to the centrifugal positions of their group, and a temporary slide 
toward nationalism. Incumbents would be held responsible for cooperating with the other 
sides, but they also would potentially be held responsible for failing to produce results 
they had promised. Since inter-ethnic cooperation is necessary for productivity, the 
political elite would have a compelling incentive to cooperate. However, that incentive 
structure did not operate in Bosnia. The traditional nationalist parties: SDA, HDZ, and 
SDS were the major proponents of the April Package, and those three parties were the 
biggest losers in the election after the package failed.121   
 The example of the 2006 April Package indicates that the consociational model 
possesses the potential to bring the three groups together. Despite intense international 
pressure, the political elite failed to compromise due to the positive incentive structure 
typical of consociationalism being broken. Siljdzic and Ljubic realized if they broke 
away, their electoral success was guaranteed. Either the reform package would pass 
leading them to argue it was an international imposition; or, the reform package would 
fail and that would validate their objections. All in all, the Bosnian consociational system 
is marred by the scapegoat-dependency cycle. The more international intervention, the 
more the incentive structure is reversed and politicians are compelled away from 
compromise.  
 
 3.7 Bonn Mutiny 
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 Since the formation of Dayton, there have been calls for two means of further 
decentralization of the state: first, the secession of the RS; second, the creation of an 
independent Croat entity. Both are contrary to Dayton and therefore the mandate of the 
OHR. Thus, the High Representative has taken great measures to block both agendas, 
including dismissals of BiH Presidents and party leaders. Recently, the nationalist Serb 
and Croat parties have borne an alliance, as Lijphart predicted the cleavages would under 
the pressure of an ‘external force.’ Covic (Croat) and Dodik (Serb) have been at the heart 
of the Bosnian political elite since the Dayton Agreement, and have represented their 
social cleavages in multiple high-level positions. 
Experts say Covic needs Dodik’s support to move towards the creation of a third 
entity. On the other side, Dodik needs Covic's support for his own plan, which is 
to continue weakening the central state, and perhaps move towards the total 
independence of the RS, which he long ago declared his life-long goal.122 
 
 This example demonstrates that the Serbs and Croats are capable of forming inter-
ethnic consensus as hoped by consociational theory. Furthermore, the alliance clearly 
leaves out the OHR, illustrating that without the scapegoat-dependency cycle 
consociationalism has merit to work in Bosnia. However it is impossible to measure the 
degree of sincerity of local elites’ calls for secession. The OHR is too quick to snuff them 
out. Therefore, perhaps in knowing the OHR will step in, Dodik and Covic will play the 
part of radical separatists in order to buttress their mantle as the nationalist leaders of the 
Serbs and Croats respectively. Then, the calls for secession, and the alliance itself, is not 
a serious venture but an act of political theatre. What remains certain, is that consensus, 																																																								
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whether artificial or genuine, has been forged excluding, and sometimes in opposition to, 
the international community.  
On the other hand, Bosniaks, generally in favor of centralizing authority in the 
civic state, tended to support OHR decisions because they coincided with their ideology. 
Since the Bosniaks very rarely made efforts to prevent an OHR decision, they did not 
possess an impetus to form consensus with the other cleavages. Conversely, the Serbs 
were most damaged by the Bosniak and OHR efforts to form Bosnian and Herzegovinian 
central authority. Instead Serbs favor entity autonomy, a legitimate claim under the 
Dayton agreement. But, when the Serb elite knew the OHR would not step in, they had 
very little reason to compromise. Thus, when the OHR abandoned its active role, the 
cleavages revaluated their strategy.  
The problem was that the political atmosphere was changing because the Serbs, 
with the arrival of Milorad Dodik, were becoming more and more vocal – and 
there was no reaction from the OHR...The problem was that the approach of the 
international community looked very inconsistent because you had Paddy 
Ashdown’s approach, which was very heavy, and then he was immediately 
replaced by Schwarz-Shilling, whose approach was extremely soft. Therefore he 
[Schwarz-Shilling] decided not to intervene and the Serbs had used it. They also 
used the failure of the April package and, by the time I arrived, it was quite clear 
that the point of no return had been crossed. That means the international 
community was no longer in a position to continue acting as during Paddy 
Ashdown’s times.123 
 
This example highlights the impotency of the OHR after the failure of the April reform 
package. The political elite caught whiff of a distracted international position,  and no 
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longer catered to the requests of the OHR. Tensions would culminate at the 2007 mutiny 
against Ljacak and the OHR’s parallel Bonn system.  
 High Representative Ljacak, frustrated by the lack of progress in long-divisive 
police reform, issued a decision on October 19, 2007 intending to prevent obstruction by 
non-participation with the executive arm of the state government.  
Bearing in mind that the principle of continuity of public service relies on the 
right for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to expect that decisions will be 
made and the business of governance will be completed on their behalf at all 
time; Noting that a pattern of postponement, delay and absenteeism contributes to 
the reduced capacity of the Council of Ministers; Considering that in order to 
give Bosnia and Herzegovina stable, effective and functional government, the 
Council of Ministers and its decision making processes require to be reformed.124 
 
This decision would prove to be HR Ljacak’s greatest mistake. He did not anticipate the 
ferocity of the response by the Serbs who supported the non-participation mechanism as a 
function of consociational theory’s segmental autonomy. RS Prime Minister, Milorad 
Dodik, responded with a thunder defense of the independent Serb police force, ‘I believe 
that Mr. Lajcak has made a huge mistake.’ Dodik said the decision confirmed an, 
‘arrogance that seeks to change the BiH constitution and that neither recognized any of 
our positions nor accepts that the RS is a part of BiH.’125 The BiH state Prime Minister, 
and member of Dodik’s party SNSD, Nikola Spiric resigned in protest to Lajcak’s 
decision by the beginning of November. Furthermore, Dodik threatened to withdraw all 
																																																								
124 “Decision Enacting the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on the 
Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Office of the High Representative. 
June 5, 2016, http://www.ohr.int/?p=64667. 
125 Merdzanovic, Democracy By Decree, 335. 
	 94	
SNSD representatives from office and resign himself if Lajcak failed to backtrack.126 
This would effectively stymie the state, but Dodik did not stop there. He called on the 
masses to protest the decision, leading to widespread demonstrations in 63 municipalities 
across Republika Srpska territory.127  
 The strong response took the OHR by surprise. While, the PIC initially backed its 
agent Ljacak, the disarray of the international community soon confounded to this being a 
rather weak promise. Lajcak quoted the Steering Board, “Any political leaders or 
institutions in BiH which defy the High Representative and the PIC Steering Board will 
be the subject of appropriate measures.”128 To Dodik, these were hollow words. Earlier in 
2007, Russia vetoed the resolution of the Kosovo status issue. In the context of a 
confident Serbia, with the backing of a growing economic and political presence of 
Russia, Dodik stepped up to the Western powers and the Bonn powers legitimacy. Dodik 
ultimately questioned if Dayton gave the OHR the right to implement Bonn power 
decisions. But Lajcak realized that the parallel system had been undone. Lajcak found the 
new ‘way out’ of deadlock to be the incentive of European integration. The OHR would 
pivot the international arm of influence from Bonn Powers sticks to EU integration 
carrots. The consociational incongruences of this external force are contained in a 
following chapter. 
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Chapter IV – The Centripetalist Antithesis 
 This chapter will focus on the second tenant of the principal argument of this 
thesis: consociational theory has been undercut by the external role of the international 
community. Further, this chapter portrays the irony of intervention in consociational 
democracies in that the more the arbitrator attempts to interfere, even in good faith, the 
worse the outcome. The previous chapter focused upon the role of the Office of the High 
Representative in creating a dependency-scapegoat cycle that reverses the incentive logic 
of consensus within the consociational model. This chapter will focus on the efforts of 
electoral manipulation in the attempt to guide the politics towards moderation. However, 
in this area too, the irony proves insurmountable. In trying to rig an electoral system to 
moderation, the international community has instead given credibility to nationalist 
politicians’ calls of foreign imposition.  
 Recall, the second official to hold the post of High Representative, the domestic 
body of civilian Dayton implementation, Carlos Westendorp realized in 1999 that 
nationalism was a chief obstructing force to the local Bosnian elite coming to consensus. 
“I am convinced that ethno-parties are responsible for the straight of affairs in the 
country,”129 Westendorp went on to say, “I tried very hard during my tenure to foster 
elections of non-nationalistic parties, more inter-ethnic parties. As my interview with the 
OHR electoral experts confirmed, the initial post-Dayton elections in 1996 cemented the 
nationalist parties in power.130 Dayton specifically referred to these wartime parties as 
brokers of the peace deal. Acknowledgement of the dominant status of these parties from 
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the war was needed to ensure Dayton would stop the conflict. Yet, lacking sensible 
foresight, the International Community was shocked by the 1996 election results. Despite 
the clear criteria of segmental autonomy in consociational theory, members of the 
International Community had wished to see the elections bring moderate (i.e. more 
liberal) voices to the local elite.  Consequently, in the decade following Dayton, the OHR 
used Bonn Powers to usurp nationalist politicians and policies. This is the focus of the 
preceding chapter, but the story continues. The international community also sought to 
dismantle nationalist power in a more discrete way. Electoral engineering along the 
theory of centripetalism was a clandestine attack on the nationalist local elites. Since this 
method ultimately failed and contributed to the credibility of nationalist political elite, it 
too demonstrates the irony of external interference in consociational Bosnia. I must 
emphasize that I do not find fault with Horowitz’s theory in its pure form. I simply find 
fault with its implementation on top of an already highly complex consociational design. 
 
4.1 Horowitz’s Alternative 
“The electoral system is the most easily manipulated element of a political 
system and therefore a powerful tool for political engineering. . . . If one wants to 
change the nature of a particular democracy, the electoral system is likely to be 
the most suitable and effective instrument for doing so.”131 
—Arend Lijphart 	
“The electoral system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional 
engineering for accommodation and harmony in severely divided societies.”132 																																																								
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  —Donald L. Horowitz 
 
 What Arend Lijphart is to consociational theory, Donald L. Horowitz is to 
centripetal theory. The two counterparts of comparative political theory are both experts 
of constitutional design, and hold the electoral system as the key ingredient to creating 
stabilized democracies, as illustrated in the preceding statements. Except that neither 
theorist condones the conventional majoritarian model of democracy in a plural society 
such as Bosnia, Lijphart and Horowitz stand across the aisle within academia of post-
conflict constitutional design.  
 The authors acknowledge that in the context of plural societies, the ‘winner take 
all’ system has often resulted in tyranny and civil war. The breakup of Yugoslavia serves 
as evidence of this conjecture. Arend Lijphart believed that the centrifugal forces found 
in societies with deep cleavages could be ‘counteracted’ by cooperation among different 
leaders of the segments within the polity.133 Recall, his theory reasoned a ‘grand 
coalition’ of political elites proportionally representing their group could bridge the gaps 
between the citizens while allowing segmental group autonomy. As described in this 
thesis, the Dayton Peace Agreement constructs tri-rotating offices, veto mechanisms, and 
segmental autonomy, qualifying post-war Bosnia as a consociational democracy. 
 On the other hand, Donald Horowitz disagrees that consociational theory is the 
optimal way to stabilize divided societies, “consociational methods are inapt to mitigate 
conflict in severely divided societies [and] are more likely the product of resolved 
struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages than they are measures to resolve struggles 
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and to moderate cleavages.”134 As this statement clearly illustrates, Horowitz reasons that 
Lijphart’s approach would not create stability in a deeply divided post-conflict scene such 
as Bosnia. He has lodged two primary grievances with consociational logic. First, 
consociationalism reinforces national/ethnic identities thereby entrenching social 
cleavages. Second, the overarching cooperation of elites cannot be taken for granted, 
especially when those elite are culpable of the descent into war.135 As a renowned expert 
on comparative constitutional design, Horowitz created an alternative theory to 
consociationalism called centripetalism.  
 Instead of letting the groups remain politically isolated, centripetalism seeks to 
pull the groups together through electoral incentives. “The alternative approach I have 
advocated is to adopt an electoral system that will make moderation rewarding by making 
politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their 
own.”136 This example demonstrates an alternative course of constitutional policy in 
Bosnia: a course of electoral manipulation to move the political elite toward the center 
(i.e. – centripetal motion) instead of granting the segments autonomy.  
 The underlying assumption in Horowitz’s model is that politicians must be given 
electoral incentives to “make moderation pay.”137 Thus, Horowitz assumes that political 
elite will ascribe to moderation by choice given the right incentives are provided by the 
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electoral system. Horowitz underlines four key changes to create the incentives for 
moderation: (1) the Alternative Voting (AV) method, (2) the formation of centrist 
coalitions, (3) the presidential office being elected by regional quotas, and (4) 
administrative federalism. While the consociational model was in use, three of these four 
centripetalist ideas were experimented with in the Bosnia.  
 As consociational theory champions the grand coalition of elite accommodation, 
centripetalists rest their faith on Alternative Voting. The system allegedly motivates elites 
to campaign outside of their nationalist group in order to receive enough votes to get 
elected. Therefore, AV forces the majority elite to consider the minority to ensure 
electoral success, resulting in moderation. Consociationalists rebut that AV leads to 
minority groups being left out of the government. They are not likely to accept another 
group in power that merely considers their interests; minorities want true representation. 
Consequently, Lijphart believes that the AV method is as “equally harmful” to divided 
societies as a first-past-the-post system because it excludes minority representation.138  
 Similar rationale explains the difference between the two theories on the topic of 
coalitions. Horowitz favors a centrist coalition that excludes the extremes, while Lijphart 
favors an inclusive grand coalition. Lastly, Horowitz believes that administrative 
federalism is key to developing moderation on a local-scale. This means forming 
constituencies that are multi-ethnic, like the Brcko district in Bosnia. In contrast, the 
consociational tends to use federalism in the event of geographically separated 
communities, such as the Republika Srpska. To conclude, consociationalism is concerned 
with empowering minorities, while centripetalism is concerned with limiting the potential 
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hegemony of majorities. Proponents of both viewpoints were present in Bosnia in the 
post-Dayton era. 
“It [international Community] continues to use its authority within the political 
sphere in attempts to influence electoral outcomes and exclude the nationalists from 
power. It has also sought to redesign constitutional and electoral systems by stealth 
to favour moderates over nationalists.”139 
 
 This example highlights the covert efforts to implement centripetalist-designed 
reform in Bosnia. The next three sections will focus on three different experiments of 
centripetalism imposed by the international community. Each section will: (1) 
contextualize the given experimental reform; (2) evaluate the disappointing results of the 
experiment in comparison to Horowitz’s theory; and (3) illustrate how the given 
experiment runs contrary to consociationalism. 
 
4.2 Alternative Voting in the Republika Srpska  
 In the AV method, or social choice function, each voter has the option of ranking 
n candidates from 1 to n on their ballot. If a candidate receives a majority of the first 
place rankings, then he/she is declared the winner. However, if no candidate receives a 
majority, then the candidate with the least first-place rankings is eliminated from all of 
the voters’ ballots. The ballots are tallied again to see if there is a majoritarian winner. If 
not, another is eliminated. This process is repeated until a candidate possesses a majority 
of the first place rankings and is declared the winner. This social choice function is also 
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known as the Hare method, and currently used in Ireland, Australia, and San Francisco.140 
Centripetalists champion the AV method because it professes to protect voters from 
wasting their ballot on less-popular candidates. Even if a voter’s top candidate were 
eliminated, this voter’s ballot would be transferred to their second-choice alternative.  
 With a high electoral threshold, the AV method is less forgiving to small parties 
than the proportional representation in consociationalism; yet, this is viewed as a benefit 
by Horowitz, “a modest reform of first-past-the-post, a sound way of diminishing the 
arbitrariness of the plurality system without yielding to the dominance of central party 
officials in candidate selection that tends to accompany list-system PR.”141 This example 
highlights how Horowitz has compensated for the issue of wasted votes in single-member 
plurality, or first-past-the-post, system.  
 The international community, according to a European Stability Initiative report 
on Bosnia report published March 2001, waged an “undeclared war” against the 
nationalist elite in the Republika Srpska. Internationals engaged in a series of strategic 
interventions to accelerate the demise of ‘Karadzic’s SDS para-state.’142 Radavan 
Karadzic was a Serb war criminal and SDS was the Serb Democratic Party, the Serb 
nationalist party in power throughout the war. Since 1997, SFOR has played a crucial 
role in arresting SDS war criminals and preventing paramilitary and intelligence services 
from playing an overt political role. Furthermore, SFOR and the OHR dismantled the 
SDS nationalist Serb propaganda machine and destabilized the clientele network SDS 
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had created using public funds. The report concludes, “By 1999, the SDS regime had 
fragmented into a series of municipal fiefdoms.”143 This soft power attack identifies the 
anti-nationalist character of the internationals.  
 Out of the disarray, the internationals lifted a new party, SNSD, led by Milorad 
Dodik, winning the 1998 election and forming a new parliamentary coalition. The 
international community rejoiced as Dodik’s government signaled the return of 80,000 
refugees in the first year in power. The government of Dodik had, ‘strong European and 
American backing, as the perceived antidote of the SDS.’144 Dodik’s external patrons 
viewed him as “a moderate with sufficient nationalist credentials to be effective.”145 
Dodik catered his policy and his statements to an international audience – they were his 
constituency. Despite tremendous funding from the international community, SNSD 
proved no better than SDS at changing the fortunes of the war-battered territory: the 
government passed a number of anti-Dayton laws stating the supremacy of the RS over 
the BiH state, financial collapse loomed with a DM 200 million deficit due to public 
money being siphoned by corrupt officials, and refugee resettlement failed to materialize. 
It was clear that SDS would regain power in 2000, but the international community 
would not accept the old nationalists back so easily. 
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 The internationals announced that Alternative Voting, the precise method 
provided by Horowitzian centripetalism, would be implemented by decree for the 2000 
Republika Srpska election. According to the European Stability Initiative, the “changes to 
the electoral rules – the introduction of preferential voting – were intended to favor 
Dodik.”146 However, instead of candidates adopting a more moderate strategy, radical 
nationalists harnessed the change to fuel their campaigns. The SDP won a commanding 
49.8% of the first-preference votes on the first round. The first party eliminated was a 
Bosniak party with only 2% of the first-place votes. This elimination was enough to tip 
the scales for a SDS majority, as depicted in Figure 4.3. The popularity of the SDS 
reflected a general suspicion of international efforts to rig the election for Dodik and 
SNSD. Further, Richard Holbrooke, the American ambassador to the United Nations, 
publicly commented that he wanted to ban SDS from the 2000 elections. This proved to 
be the cherry on top of the reactionary push against SNSD and the foreign manipulators. 
Contrary to the Horowitz’s assumptions, the nationalist hardliners not only won the 
election, but also won by a larger margin than they did in the simultaneous elections to 
the RS National Assembly and to the BiH House of Representatives, in which they also 
beat out SNSD.  
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 Sumantra Bose points out that one of Horowitz’s key conditions for preferential 
social choice functions to produce cross-cleavage results, “electoral constituencies that 
are heterogeneous (mixed) in their ethnic make-up,” are not present in Bosnia.147  Of the 
628,443 voters in the 2000 RS election, 525,325 (84%) were cast in RS polling stations, 
presumably by Serbs, while absentee voters, presumably Bosniaks, cast the remaining 
16%. Thus, Bose concludes, there is not a ‘sufficiently heterogeneous’ population for the 
AV method to create the centripetal effect desired.  
Nevertheless, preferential voting for the RS Presidency was unlikely to be a 
reliable test for at least for two reasons. First, this system is unlikely to produce 
conciliatory behavior where ethnic groups are concentrated in particular 
geographic regions. In these instances, the politicians’ incentive to seek support 
from various groups depends on the presence and size of minority groups. 
Because the RS electorate was not ethnically heterogeneous, only under the most 
unusual circumstances could AV [alternative votes/voting] have influenced the 
results.148 
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Political Party 1
st 
Preference 
Percent of 
Vote 
2nd 
Preference 
Votes after 
Transfer 
Percent of 
Vote 
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)  313,572  49.8  35  313,607  50.1  
Party of Independent Democrats 
(SNSD)  161,942  25.7  212  162,154  25.9  
Party of Democratic Progress of 
the Republika Srpska (PDP)  54,392  8.6  41  54,433  8.7  
Social Democratic Party (SDP)  48,992  7.8  3,419  52,411  8.4  
Civic Democratic Party (GDS)  37,614  6.0  5,220  42,834  6.8  
Bosniak Party (BOSS)  12,851  2.0  -12,851  0  0  
Total  629,363  100  -3924  625,439  100  
Votes required (50 per cent)  314,681.5      
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 The territory of the Republika Srpska was callously gerrymandered throughout 
the course of the war, resulting in a patchwork homogenous population. Non-Serbs 
accounted for 46% of the population in RS territory prior to the war, but that figure fell to 
only three percent by 1997.149 With Serb returns nearly double the quantity of Bosniaks, 
and Croats’ numbers almost insignificant, refugee resettlement did little to offset the 
monoethnicity. Therefore, Serb voters had no incentive to elect a moderate candidate to 
accommodate the other cleavages while they could comfortably elect a nationalist 
candidate on their own that guarantees Serb interests. Furthermore, the Bosniak absentee 
voters did not cross over ethnic lines in support of SNSD as the international community 
hoped. Despite being outnumbered by Serb voters by a ratio of six to one, Bosniaks still 
decided to vote along ethnic lines, even if they knew their candidate would lose. The only 
non-ethnic, truly moderate party, SDP, did not put up a fight against the nationalists, 
despite having a Serb presidential candidate. Conclusively, Alternative Voting did not 
create the cross-cleavage voting the centripetalism model hoped for in the 2000 RS 
elections.  
 How did centripetalism affect the consociational norm? The elite incentive 
structure created by consociational democracy supposes that the collective interests of 
minorities will be accounted for through quota mechanisms, such as the necessity to have 
equal representation of the three ethnic groups in legislative and executive institutions. 
The RS Council of Peoples requires 8 Bosniaks, 8 Croats, 8 Serbs, and 4 others and the 
RS Council of Ministers has 16 ministries of which 5 are Bosniak, 3 are Croat, and 8 are 
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Serb. However, centripetalism undermines this fragile balance, seeking to use a voting 
method that already allegedly accounts for the minority interests. By stacking another 
layer of imposition on the already malcontent Republika Srpska citizens, a backlash 
against the international community should have been foreseeable.  
4.4 The Alliance for Change: A Centrist Coalition 
 As the international community’s investment in the RS backfired with SDS 
sweeping the 2000 elections, another centripetal move was transpiring on another, 
grander stage. The first centrist coalition, dubbed the ‘Alliance for Change,’ was formed 
in the BiH state government on the coattails of the narrowly victorious, non-nationalist 
Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP formed a centrist coalition with nine other 
small parties that emphatically excluded the big three nationalist parties from the war: 
SDP, HDZ, and SDA.  While the Alliance’s triumph was espoused as a victory for the 
future of Bosnia, behind the curtain lurked the international community pulling all of the 
strings. While the accomplishments of the Alliance are commendable, this example also 
highlights the consequences of externally imposed centripetalism working in 
contradiction of the consociational model. 
 The internationals had begun a “vigorous campaign”150 against the nationals in 
the previous municipal elections in 1998 that saw Dodik’s SNSD win a majority in the 
National Assembly as mentioned in the previous section. Therefore, the internationals 
stuck to this strategy for the general elections in 2000. NATO Secretary General George 
Robertson and US President Bill Clinton were among the choir of peripheral voices 
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supporting the moderates in this race.151  Moreover, the fall of Milosevic in neighboring 
Serbia and the death of Franjo Tudman in Croatia, saw the end of the two great 
nationalist leaders from the war simultaneously exit the political scene at the turn of the 
century. The new governments of Serbia and Croatia opted against supporting their 
Bosnian counterparts quite as generously as their predecessors. In response, the SDP 
caught a lucky break with regional nationalist slump and supplementary support of the 
internationals coinciding with the 2000 general elections. 
 In the Federation BiH, the Alliance included  SDP and SBiH (previously 
mentioned in this thesis). Plus, the Croat representative was NSRzB replacing its big 
brother HDZ. On a state level, PDP, SNSD, SPSR, and SNS from the Republika Srpska 
joined the alliance to earn a slight majority over HDZ, SDA and SDS. Because of this 
narrow majority, the Alliance was an incredibly stretched coalition, needing all the small 
parties in order to form a majority.  There was no ideological consistency within the 
coalition; therefore the internationals were needed to step in with, “energetic lobbying 
and arm-twisting by the then American and British ambassadors.”152 In result, the 
Alliance was borne out of an internationally compelled marriage of ten parties. 
This alliance of Federation-based parties of disparate size, ideological orientation 
and national coloration has cooperated at state level with parties from Republika 
Srpska that are both in power and in opposition in that entity. The Alliance has 
thus lacked cohesion on both levels of government. It has sought to push a 
reform agenda, but one that cannot help but reflect the lowest common 
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denominator of what is acceptable to its different sets of partners in the 
Federation and the Council of Ministers.153 
 
 However, it cannot be unstated that the Alliance did accomplish a degree of 
success. Most notably, the Alliance passed a permanent election law, which allowed 
Bosnia to join the Council of Europe during the Alliance’s tenure. On the other hand, 
much of the progress was in the form of strengthening state structures and making 
institutions work better, invisible changes in eyes of the voters. Thus, after two years, the 
Alliance lost its slim majority to the nationalists. In no election since have the nationalist 
parties –HDZ, SDA, SDS, or SNSD (which morphed into the dominant Serb nationalist 
party) – been universally excluded from a ruling coalition of the BiH state House of 
Representatives. While some success was accomplished by the Alliance, the voters have 
never since elected to have this type of government again. Perhaps this is due to the fact 
the Alliance was unfocused and undisciplined, unlike their nationalist counterparts. 
 The Alliance for Change illustrates how the consociational ‘grand coalition’ 
conflicts with the centripetalist, ‘centrist coalition.’ As the international community seeks 
to form a centrist coalition, nationalist members are innately excluded. Since the center 
hardly exists in Bosnia, and certainly is not a majority without the perfect combination of 
external factors (and even then barely so), then the notion of a centrist coalition is an 
exclusionary measure against the vast majority of Bosnians. This demonstrates that the 
centrist coalition implementation is quite contradictory to democratic principles. 
Moreover, by empowering a centrist coalition of the internationals making, fundamental 
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state building was done by the puppets of the external forces instead of by the Bosnian 
elite, which de facto represent the significant portion of citizens in Bosnia. Therefore, the 
elite accommodation that is supposed to be “learned”154 instead of merely institutionally 
imposed in a consociational system, is unable to take hold. In the long-term, this results 
in the collapse of consociationalism entirely.  
 Horowitz critiques grand coalitions for prohibiting the formation of a healthy 
opposition within the legislature, thereby the political elites are not held accountable by 
their peers. Horowitz labels this as one of the “peculiar set of problems” that ethnically 
divided countries face in democratization.155 He contends that in a consociational system 
the voters are unable to vote elites out of power. Lijphart’s response would be that, in a 
plural society, it would be more damaging for national stability to not have the segments 
represented, than to have this sort of competition. This was the line of logic of the Dayton 
creators, and as to why the Constituent Peoples decision by the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court in 2000 granted tripartite appointments according to ethnicity across Bosnian 
institutions. Besides, every ethnic group, even Croats, have had multiple ethnic-oriented 
alternatives in the political scene. SDA, HDZ, and especially SDS have lost numerous 
elections to opposing parties. An opposition does exist in Bosnia, but it should not play a 
robust function within the consociational framework. According to Lijphart, an 
opposition would entail minority oppression. 
 The consistent inability of coalitions to properly function has been a feature of 
Bosnia since Dayton; “A coalition means an alliance of members acting jointly to achieve 
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an agreed goal. This is not the case now. The question is whether it ever was...it was clear 
from the beginning that their interests were opposed,” said Adis Arapovic, a political 
analyst at the Centre for Civic Initiatives, in May 2017.156 The context he is referring to is 
the recent breakdown of the 2014 general election state-level coalition among Bosniak 
SDA and SBB, Croat HDZ, and Serb SDS and PDP and its rocky experience during and 
after the 2016 local elections. Continuous failures to form governments have plagued the 
Federation. For example, despite the incentive of millions worth of International 
Monetary Fund loans, the politicians in the following ruling coalition failed four times to 
pass an excise law as of May 2017. Not until December of the year could were they able 
to come to sufficient consensus to secure approximately one billion euros of much 
needed development funds.157 Despite the slow progress, the American ambassador 
rejoiced at the accomplishment. But why did consensus take so long on such an issue? 
Part of the answer lies in the weakness of the coalition itself.  
 The international community has attempted to pressure Bosnia to create cross-
cleavage coalitions and this has been successful. In the 2014 elections, HDZ, SDS, and 
SDA formed a ruling coalition, however the coalition failed to pass consistent 
legislation.158 This is evidenced in the excise law, despite the massive incentive given by 
the international community. At the Federation level, a coalition between SDA, HDZ, 
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and Democratic Front (DF) dissolved only a few months after the 2014 polls leaving the 
government dysfunctional for months. This is not the exception in Bosnia; rather, 
coalition breakdown is the norm. In the most extreme case of crosscutting coalition 
failure, the major city of Mostar has lacked elected officials since 2008. This illustrates 
that the centrist coalition vision is impractical in the context of Bosnia.  
 Horowitz would term the 2014 arrangement as a “coalition of convenience,” 
which was strategically built by nationalist factions, and he would be correct.159 Instead 
of promoting stability, Horowitz believes a coalition of convenience will sham 
camaraderie due to the incentive to hold power. However, this argument fails to 
acknowledge that the ten party Alliance for Change in 2001 the internationals bolstered 
to power comprised of much more extreme spectrum than the 2014 marriage of 
convenience. The internationals themselves deployed the most notable example of a 
“coalition of convenience.” In trying to escape this fate, the internationals simply plunged 
Bosnia deeper into its snares. The nationalists were able to mobilize behind the common 
enemy posed by the international interference, precisely as Lijphart predicts what will 
happen in a consociational system in the shadow of an “external threat.” Since the 
coalition of convenience was forged by the internationals, the nationalists bonded 
together: 
The final irony is that the parties representing the victims of Serbian aggression 
against the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war are now, likewise, 
eager partners with the SDS—the party formerly of Karadžić, which orchestrated 
the genocide and all but destroyed the country’s social and economic fabric.160 																																																								
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 As this example from the 2014 coalition building effort demonstrates, the 
centripetalist model has been pushed on Bosnia with detrimental effects. The coalitions 
are simply of convenience between extreme parts, thus any attempt to work towards 
moderation and exclude these extremes, would result in a nationalist fervor as it did in the 
aftermath of the Alliance for Change in 2002. The bottom line is that Lijphart’s notion of 
a grand coalition, where the elite are comfortable representing the fragile views of their 
minority, is negatively impacted by the promotion of centrist opposition by the 
international community and ironically leads to further radicalization. Centripetalist, 
centrist coalitions have proven fallible in Bosnia because the center does not exist in large 
enough quantities to be democratically feasible. 
 
4.4 Brcko: Administrative Federalism 
Therefore, the constituent units of a centripetalist federation would not be formed 
around the groups involved in the conflict, as in consociations, but rather would 
ideally consist of heterogeneous units wherein the groups are intermixed. 
Arranging the constituent units in such a fashion is commended for “its capacity 
to lower the high temperature of politics at the center by reducing the all-or-
nothing nature of the stakes at that level” and for its ability to socialize norms of 
interethnic cooperation.161  
 
There are no alternative voting methods, centrist coalitions or presidential offices 
being elected by regional quotas in Brcko, so it too cannot be claimed as an ideal 
application of centripetal design. However, the centripetal notion of administrative 
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federalism is certainly present, granting an insightful experiment with this centripetalist 
motive. This characteristic of Horowitz’s theory is characterized by the federalist choice 
to draw ethnically heterogeneous districts. Horowitz believed a plural society should not 
be carved into the mono-ethnic constituencies; rather multiethnic districts would facilitate 
micro-cooperation among the cleavages that could eventually translate to cooperation on 
a grand scale. According to the 2013 census, Brcko has a population of 83,416 
inhabitants of which Bosniaks account for 42.36%, Serbs 34.58%, Croats 20.66%, and 
others 2.28%. This demographic demonstrates that the Brcko district adheres to the 
centripetal characteristic of administrative federalism. While the Republika Srpska entity 
and Federation BiH cantons are nearly completely homogenous, Brcko proves to be the 
noteworthy exception. 
While most of the governing units of Bosnia are homogenous, the Brcko region is 
an exception. In fact, Brcko is an exception in more ways than one. Brcko is a port town 
on the river Sava in the northeastern corner of Bosnia, but it was undoubtedly the most 
fought over spit of land throughout the war due to its strategic location and mixed 
population. The 1991, pre-war census placed the Brcko population at 87,627, of which 
44.1% Bosniak, 20.7% Serb, 7.0% Croat, 12.6% Yugoslav, and 5.0% others.162 The 
gloomy trend in the Bosnian conflict was that previously peaceful multi-ethnic 
communities became the frontlines of nationalist forces. As the international community 
attempted to end the war in Dayton, heated controversy over Brcko threatened to tank the 
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entire peal agreement in 1995.163 The district’s military importance is evident in the fact 
it forms a land bridge between the two halves of the Republika Srpska as well as between 
the Posavina canton and the rest of the Federation territory. The Brcko valley also 
borders the adjacent country of Croatia and is less than 30km from the Serbian border. 
Clearly, the little valley was stuck as the crossroad of the Yugoslav conflict. And due to 
this, Serb forces wasted no time before invading in April 1992. Crimes of ethnic 
cleansing from Brcko led the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) to 
indict Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic. In all, the territory witnessed terrible devastation, 
even in the context of the Bosnian War, making a diplomatic solution at Dayton almost 
impossible to reach.  
The issue Dayton could not agree on was which entity would be awarded the 
district. The sides failed to concede and the decision was postponed. Lord Roberts Owen 
was tasked with making a final judgment on Brcko within a year.164 However, Lord 
Owen would annually delay for five years until March 1999, before giving the decision 
that the Brcko district would be awarded to neither entity and continue to operate 
autonomously with independent parliaments, courts and governments. Due to this, Brcko 
is an exotic element in the Bosnian theatre. Yet, the international community 
implemented key consociational components like the rest of Bosnia. For example, the 
Brcko Municipal Assembly would have a president, vice president, and secretary all of a 
different ethnicity. Plus, the president of the executive board of the municipality would 
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have two deputies, all three individuals required to be of different nationalities.165 Article 
33a of the Statue of Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Prevention of 
Outbidding,” contains requirements of the presence of all three ethnic groups for various 
important legislative functions.166 Thus, the consociationalism is not altogether 
vanquished in Brcko. 
On the other hand, Brcko contains many un-consociational measures. While 
Brcko remains under the auspices of the central state, it rules with a higher degree of self-
government than the rest of the country. The local polity in Brcko governs policy areas 
such as police and education167 while these powers are vested in the entity level in the 
FBiH and RS constitutions. The Brcko parliament has 31 Councilors, with the only 
caveat is that two of which must represent solely ‘others’ minorities.168 There are no 
further parliamentary quotas or veto mechanisms for ethnic groups like there are in the 
entity and state level legislatures. This is an abrupt departure from consociational design. 
Even more surprisingly, parliamentary decisions are made by simple majority rule, exotic 
in the context of consociational Bosnia. Thus, the district is a combination of the two 
clashing theories. 
Brcko also exhibits the dependency-scapegoat cycle of ironic external 
intervention. The external powers played the integral role in fundamental state building in 
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Brcko, especially in refugee return and elections. Due to this superfluous oversight, 
Brcko shared the same fate as the Bosnian whole – an imposition of consensus.  
Right from the very beginning certainly from the beginning of the supervisory 
regime we did not seek to do things by consensus. It was just imposed. You 
know “democracy” came fairly low down the list of what was required in terms 
of getting the job done.169 
-Former Brcko OHR Official, 2nd June 2003 
 
Starting from the beginning, on March 14, 1996, the final award of Brcko, as 
prescribed by Dayton, was due to be decided. But, the international community 
considered the situation too volatile, and instead announced that the OHR would establish 
an office in the district. On March 7, 1997, the PIC once again pushed back the decision. 
High Representative Carl Bildt appointed the U.S. Ambassador Robert Farrand as 
Supervisor of Brcko.170 The Supervisor was essentially the OHR of Brcko; acting to 
ensure laws and officials did not violate Dayton. On March 15, 1998, for the third time, 
the Final Award was postponed. Furthermore, The PIC granted the Supervisor Bonn 
powers – the ability to remove elected officials and enforce law without a checks and 
balances. On March 5, 1999, the Final Award was finally given, granting the Brcko 
district to the international community rather than the entities. In June 1999, the Brcko 
Law Revision Commission (BLRC) was established comprising of one representative 
from the Republika Srpska, two from the Federation, and a number of international 
lawyers. The BLRC reformed the judiciary, executive, legislature and continued on to 
improve education, labor, and property law. 
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The BLRC was funded separately from the OHR. As the BLRC's structure and 
funding make clear, the draftsman of the Final Award intended to create a 
legislative drafting commission dedicated solely to the Supervisor and 
independent of the OHR, with a view to ensuring that the legal reform envisioned 
for the District would be carried out without any coercive interference or 
influence by the international community, including the OHR itself.171 
 
As this example demonstrates, the BLRC was aware of the negative effects of excessive 
international pressure. The only difference between the OHR scapegoat-dependency 
cycle and the BLRC is that the BLRC closed up shop. On May 23, 2012, the OHR issued 
a decision that their office in Brcko would be closed and the Supervisor would be 
suspended. Despite the initial symmetry of the international approach of the Brcko 
Supervisor with the OHR, the two paths finally did diverge. But, this has not been 
because the inspiring results of Brcko. In fact, today Brcko follows the same misery as 
the rest of the country: stuck with corrupt political elite and economic depression. In the 
most recent general elections (2016), the nationalist parties of SDS (Serb), SNSD (Serb), 
SDA (Bosniak), and HDZ (Croat) were the winners of the most seats in the Assembly. 
Ballots for these parties accounted for more than half of the total votes cast.  
 Identical the prior two examples of centripetalist intervention, the nationalist elite 
have grew stronger in the face of external pressure. Both the Alliance for Change centrist 
coalition and the AV method in Republika Srpska shared this fate, and in Brcko, the 
result has been the same. After the first elections in the newly formed Bosnia in 1996, 
Brcko erupted in riots against the OHR, OSCE and other international institutions 
																																																								
171 Karnavas, “Creating the Legal Framework,” 114. 
	 119	
labeling them, “the occupying army.”172 Robert W. Farrand was the first Supervisor of 
the Brcko district, and reveals with harrowing honesty the process of helping Bosniaks 
and Croats relocate to their old homes, reversing ethnic cleansing, build new hosing for 
Serb refugees, rejuvenate the local economy, create a legal system, give authority to a 
multi-ethnic legislative assembly, reintegrate the police force, and many more state-
building measures. Farrand admits he could fit the description of a dictator, and the Brcko 
citizens often saw him as such. 
When the Kosovo scene exploded, American attention was directed elsewhere. 
Over the next few years, the Americans engaged less in Brcko, and the city folded into 
the same melancholy as the rest of Bosnia. 
Multi-ethnicity collapsed, corruption re-emerged, the public institutions created 
by Farrand and his team disintegrated, and private capital fled. When, from 2006, 
the US disengaged more or less completely from the supervision project, Brcko 
District collapsed. It now persists as a sad well of endemic poverty, ethnic 
resentment and political insecurity. Tacit repartition has begun, and gradual 
envelopment by Republika Srpska – the very evil that supervision was supposed 
to foreclose – has returned as a credible political prospect.173 
-Mathew Parish, Chief Legal Adviser to the International Supervisor of Brcko 
 
This result beckons the question; if the decline of Brcko coincided with the 
decreased presence of international supervision, then why not reintroduce external 
pressure? But, this conclusion is optimistic of the international commitment to the region. 
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At first, Brcko was heralded as the shining example of Bosnian reconstruction and 
international democratization efforts. Privatization of companies and economic growth 
surpassed the rest of the country. 800 American troops and the creation of a multi-ethnic 
police force made remarkable progress in refugee returns.174 However, beneath this veil 
of top-level institutional progress, the citizens of Brcko remain divided. Janine Natalya 
Clark finds evidence of three harrowing themes from researching the grassroots 
cooperation of ethnic groups in Brcko, “that the war is a taboo topic, that trust is in short 
supply and that important inter-ethnic divides persist.”175 As Clark aptly points out, this is 
startling data for the long-term viability of democracy in Brcko. While the top-level 
institutions created an aesthetic of sustainability, the return of Brcko to the clutches of the 
nationalist elite in the recent election (2016) signifies that the multi-ethnic efforts of the 
international community did not sink into the social fabric. Moreover, these efforts failed 
because they were centripetalist in nature and tried to overcome deep social divisions by 
placing a very multi-ethnic constituency in a single district. But, perhaps this was the best 
course of action for the international community to take with regard to the highly 
controversial region, it does not warrant the continued interface of foreigners in Brcko.  
Even if Brcko was an oasis under external control, this was not a self-sustainable. 
Brcko failed to produce moderation as Horowitz foretold. Contrary to centripetalism, in 
June 2008, the Supervisor of Brcko elected to enact a consociational adjustment that 
decisions on sensitive subjects such as religion, culture, education, monuments, language, 
budget and spatial planning now require support from at least one-third of the councilors 																																																								
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from each ethnic group or, in legal terms, each constituent peoples.176 This example 
highlights how the centripetalist experiment with administrative federalism was 
determined to be a failure in Brcko. The minority groups needed this consociational 
mechanism to prevent the predatory danger of majorities along the same logic of Dayton. 
All in all, Brcko offers yet another example of a harmful attempt at centripetalist reform 
within the consociational framework. 
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Chapter V – European Pressure 
 The last two chapters have focused on aspects of external pressure that have 
caused rupture in consociational implementation in Bosnia since the enactment of Dayton 
treaty in 1996. This chapter will focus on a third occurrence regarding external pressure 
of European integration on the Bosnian political sphere. This chapter will argue that 
consociational theory has been warped because the external actors, specifically the 
institutions of the European Union, have predetermined the points of accommodation on 
behalf of the local Bosnian elite. This has been a form of indirect imposition.  
 Recall from Chapter 2, within consociational theory there are a values of 
convergence that represent where the all the elite would eventually come to a 
compromising position. This is the output of the mathematical equations. Without 
carefully calculating the coefficients and starting positions, we are incapable of 
controlling the point of convergence. Moreover, it may be rather implausible to reach a 
convergence point with certain coefficients starting values. In this Chapter, imagine if an 
external force predetermines a value of convergence. For example, an external force 
predetermines the budget for border security. Given the external forces lack of control of 
the starting points and have limited control of the coefficients, setting a predetermined 
convergence point is extremely unlikely to match the model’s calculated value. In result, 
imposing a border security budget is likely to leave one or more groups cheated out of the 
consociational process of mutual accommodation. The theory of consociationalism 
argues that a consensus point would be achieved by a grand coalition; however, Lijphart 
did not say that consensus point could be predetermined or controlled by an imposing 
council. Yet, this is the reality of the European Union’s policy toward consociational 
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Bosnia. External forces have set consensus points on behalf of the local elite. This is the 
third manner the international community has undermined consociational theory. 
 The process of integration to the European Union (EU) has been the root of 
substantial intervening action in Bosnia since the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. This section will solidify the accuracy of this statement through numerous 
facets including: the OHR double-hatting as the EU Special Representative, the 
imposition of the Sejdic and Finci case from the European Court for Human Rights 
(ECHR), and the dire situation of state capture begun by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Through these 
avenues, the internationals formed an obstinate burden on the consociational system in 
Bosnia in the past decade. The theory has been eroded. As preceding the two chapters 
illustrate, the external pressure from Bonn Powers and centripetalist reforms have faded; 
however, European integration pressure has largely been sustained. This chapter will 
distinguish how external imposition from a European integration perspective has resulted 
in the undermining of consociational democracy.   
 
5.1 Occasional Goodwill: The EU Club  
 As Yugoslavia fell into disarray in the early 1990’s, the European Community 
(not yet named the EU) declared itself primus inter pares (first among equals) to provide 
a solution to the predicament. The head of the EC at the time stated it was “the hour of 
Europe, not the United States”177 to solve the problems that faced its continent. However, 
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I have exhaustively illustrated that the United States under the Clinton Administration 
took a key role in military intervention through the NATO alliance. Nevertheless, the 
European Union wished to play a prominent role in the reconstruction of Bosnia 
affirming: 
The European Union will coordinate it actions with other members of the 
international community in order to provide long-term assistance with the 
objectives of supporting economic development, reinforcement of civil society 
and reconciliation and regional economic co-operation. In the perspective of 
peace, the EU is developing its long-term policy toward the region, to help build 
stability and prosperity.178 
 
 While the EU was committed to Bosnia, the Union attached the typical 
conditionality principles that Bosnia would adhere to measures of human rights, 
democratic practices, and the rule of law in order to advance in the process.  On January 
10, 2018, I interviewed two individuals at the Office of the High Representative in 
Sarajevo, Bosnia that requested anonymity, but described the process of joining the EU 
as the following: 
The EU is a club, and they say you must meet all of the criteria in order to join. If 
you do not have them all, then you cannot join. The EU tells us (Bosnia) to come 
back when we have everything, then they will consider us.179 
 
 Before joining the EU, a prospective member state must adopt the acquis 
communautaire, “80,000 pages of EU law governing thirty-three major subjects, 
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including taxation, commerce, judiciary, fundamental rights, and environmental 
regulations.”180 The prospective member must demonstrate an adherence to the acquis on 
every level of government in society. Thus, this was the chief goal of the EU from the 
birth of Bosnia in 1995. Then, the Europeans established the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SPA) in 1999 for the Western Balkan countries, including Bosnia, 
to: “draw closer the prospect of full integration into the EU structures, and supporting 
consolidation of democracy, rule of law, economic development and reform.”181 The EU 
and Bosnia attended the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, officially endorsing the SAP 
and the EU conditionality principle as the token into the continental ‘club.’ In order for 
Bosnia to meet EU conditions, it must pass laws in accordance with the following: The 
Copenhagen Criteria (1993), the conditions set by the SPA meetings (1997,1999), the 
Zagreb declaration, and the Thessaloniki Agenda (2003).182 The last of these documents 
strengthened the SPA and kicked off a pact called the “European Partnership.” This 
document, officially initiated by the EU in June 2004, developed a plan with a set 
timetable of European priorities for Bosnia. In November 2005, the EU Commission 
believed that BiH had made enough progress to begin talks of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements (SAA). In June 2008, the SAA deal was done and BiH and the 
Union entered into a contractual relationship where BiH had to complete reforms on 
liberalization and institution building to guarantee qualifying for EU membership status. 
This concludes the summary of EU-Bosnia relations from 1995 to 2008. 
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 There are multitudes of factors to consider in the EU-Bosnia process. One, the 
Union’s top priority in the late 90’s and turn of the century was not accession Bosnia and 
its Western Balkan neighbors, but the “economic facilitation” of Central and Eastern 
countries.183 Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic achieved EU membership 
in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. EU accession in these Central European 
countries was an effort to bring free-market reforms to the former Eastern bloc. 
Although, these countries did not contain three ethnic cleavages, two separate federal 
units, and a state government with very limited capabilities. Most of the struggle in BiH 
has been focused on centralizing power in the state-level body, hence antagonizing the 
fragile autonomy of Serbs and Croats supposedly allowed in a consociational model. The 
centralized countries in Central and Eastern Europe more easily accommodated EU 
conditions and were hurried under their economic umbrella.  
 Extreme financial assistance was used to push along the broken Dayton cart on 
the long road of EU integration. The EU was the largest donor to Bosnia from the 
international community from 1996 to 2003, issuing billions of euros of reconstruction 
aid. The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability 
(CARDS) program became the primary vestibule of support of the EU designed for SAP 
countries. Between 2001 and 2006, BiH made use of €412 million from CARDS. 
However, this is dwarfed by €1.952 billion grand total of EU assistance, as of 2006, since 
the conflict ended. Without a doubt, the financial assistance was meant to induce the 
Bosnian elite to accommodate the EU conditions. In good faith, the Europeans have 
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attempted to create stability and foster democracy in Bosnia, but the European 
Partnership part of the SPA became a tool of imposition.  
 This European Partnership outlines short and medium-term priorities of BiH in 
excruciating detail; everything from police to public broadcasting reform is contained in 
this document. This is how the EU selected consensus points for the Bosnian elite, 
contrary to consociational theory. While the Europeans were arguing the necessity of 
ownership of the reform process by the Bosnians, at the same time they were threatening 
to cut off financial assistance if the conditions of the European Partnership were not met, 
“The EU attempted to leverage the accession process as a permanent conflict 
transformation tool.”184 Thus, the European Partnership was a coercive and punitive 
document intended to impose state building and democratization on Europe’s terms, not 
the elected Bosnian leadership’s. With consistent and very intentionally configured 
holdups within the Dayton system, Bosnia was unable to meet deadlines on many of the 
EU conditions. For example, the Croats used the vital interest mechanism to prevent the 
passage of public broadcasting reform, thus it failed to make the deadline by 2011. 
Bosnians absorb public broadcasting along ethnic lines,185 making efforts by the 
internationals to impose a nationwide broadcaster challenging. By consociational theory 
this is an intentional design, and should not be easy to strip minorities of autonomous 
rights. But since the Madrid Peace Implementation Council in 1998 gave entities the 
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reigns of public broadcasting, the Croats have a claim against external imposition. Calls 
for an independent Croat TV station continue today.186 
 The logic of the Bosnian elite is understandable, they do not see EU membership 
as a realistic goal in their electoral lifespan of two or four years so they are not willing to 
commit. But, the elite are compelled to rehearse an interest in EU integration because it 
unlocks funds. Therefore, the EU conditionality principle works in reverse; instead of 
acting as a current of consensus, EU membership provokes social and political cleavages. 
This is done the following way: The elite are delivered a plethora of laws, 80,000 to be 
exact, in which they must find consensus on without any exceptions in order to join the 
European Union. This burdens the consociational structure with an exceptional task; one 
that Lijphart certainly did not have in mind when formulating the political theory. Instead 
of developing compromises, the Bosnians are left scrambling over with the option to 
accept or reject EU conditions. External forces, which have imbedded themselves into the 
Bosnian structure through Dayton, have not offered alternative policy options. The 
‘Alliance for Change’ (2000-2002) illustrated that even securing membership in the 
Council of Europe was not sufficient to win popularity in the highly fragmented society 
of Bosnia. Therefore, the process of EU accession is not politically beneficial to the elite 
apart from the occasional funding for the process. 
 A deal struck in Mostar on police reform in late 2007 exemplifies the elite issuing 
a gesture of goodwill to appease the OHR. During and immediately after the war, police 
forces were divided along ethnic lines and operated only within the territory controlled by 
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their group.187 While Dayton merged the Croat and Bosniak forces, Republika Srpska 
stubbornly refused. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) has been the chief international 
advisory institution for the Bosnian elite on the matter since 2003. The EUPM was 
informed, by the Council of Europe, to “establish sustainable policing arrangements 
under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice.”188 
Thus, the 2007 deal decided in Mostar was important for their purpose. Implementation 
of the deal struck was tasked to the EUPM shortly after the deal, but they made dismal 
progress. This is chiefly because the deal silently died with the advent of local elections 
in 2008 and the return of local elite to their centrifugal tendencies. While this is to be 
expected in a consociational incentive framework, the continual failure of the cleavages 
to return to the center after elections represents a defunct consociational arrangement. A 
study published in 2014 in the International Journal of Security & Development found 
that the efforts of the EU and UN in police reform are, “unfinished business,” after 17 
years of efforts.189 Despite annual negotiations and declarations, there is still no real 
change in sight. A statement from the OHR cements the reality of the Bosnian elite’s 
theatrics when it comes to EU conditions: 
The political leadership divides the country into three parts – let us face it. They 
have absolute control over the political process, appointments, economic life, and 
other things. The philosophy is: I don't touch you – you do not touch me. 
Obviously, any process of European integration would limit the freedom in 
dealing with their part of BiH. So they are not really interested, that is clear.190 
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-Miroslav Lajcak, High Representative 
 
 In the meantime, the Bosnian elite will resort to ethno-nationalist rhetoric to 
remain in office while EU conditions backlog meaningful accommodation. As long as the 
elite make occasional gestures of progress toward the EU conditions, they will secure EU 
financial assistance. This is only rational. All in all, the external pressure of the EU 
ironically causes ethno-nationalism to become a more rationale choice for the Bosnian 
elite to maintain political viability.   
 
5.2 OHR Double-Hatting 
 Chapter 3 focused on the scapegoat-dependency cycle that infects the relationship 
between the OHR and Bosnian polity within the consociational logic. This section will 
pick up in 2008 where that chapter left off. HR Christian Schwarz-Shilling issued the 
demise of the Bonn Powers in 2006 when he refused to step in in the wake of April 
package failure. While the scapegoat-dependency cycle left long lasting consequences on 
the consociational system, the OHR pivoted to a European strategy after the Bonn 
powers. The OHR would absorb the role as EU Special Representative, despite this being 
incongruous with the OHR mandate prescribed by Dayton. This “double hatting” has 
perpetuated the European imposition of predetermined consensus points (i.e. – deciding 
beforehand what the politicians must agree on) because it made fundamental state 
building equivalent to EU integration. This is another form of imposition. 
 Miroslav Lajcak became the High Representative (2007-2009) after the lame duck 
period of Schwarz-Shilling. After the failure of the internationally supported 2006 April 
Package, the political elite who supported the deal felt betrayed. Serbs used the failure as 
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an excuse to attack centralized state-power.191 However, centralizing state authority was 
the overriding agenda of the European Union and the purpose of the 2006 April package. 
This fueled the showdown of the Serbs and OHR Bonn Powers in 2007, which I 
described as a successful mutiny in Chapter 3. This signaled the last breath of the Bonn 
Power era, and a transition of the OHR to a European integrationist strategy. Lajcak 
recognized this transitioning role of the OHR, “As a result of this August 2007, I started 
very actively promoting the European idea.”192  
 Miroslav Lajcak’s first priority as the High Representative was to convince the 
European Union to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) on behalf of 
Bosnia.193 Nonetheless, Bosnia needed to meet the nonnegotiable conditions of the SAA, 
including the polarizing issue of police reform, in order to continue the European process. 
With the Bonn Powers dead in the water, Lajcak chose to embody the prospect of EU 
integration to induce cooperation on the police issue, promising the Bosnian politicians 
he could convince the European Commission to speed up the process in return for 
consensus on a deal. He went so far as to promote the signing of the SAA as integral for 
Bosnian accession to the EU club  (which there was popular support for among Serbs).194 
He gathered the political elite of Bosnia, including the mutinous Serbs, in Mostar for a 
conference in late 2007. The major parties finally chalked up a solution to the police 
reform issue, or rather accepted Lajcak’s imposition with the incentive of the SAA 
signature by the EU, “Lajcak warned the politicians it was their last chance if they were 
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sincere about EU membership.”195 In good faith, on December 4th, 2007, the Europeans 
initialed the SAA, but this marked a hallow victory for the internationals. HR Lajcak 
managed to turn the situation around, but realized in the process how limited the OHR’s 
state building capacities were without strong Bonn powers. 
But that was the moment when you realized that it was actually the European 
perspective that is more powerful than the Bonn powers...And it was very clear 
from that moment that you cannot be using Bonn powers to change the political 
life, because the Serbs would say ‘no’ – and you would have no authority to 
impose, to enforce your decision. Therefore I said: formally you keep supporting 
the Bonn powers, but deep down you understand that you are a paper tiger.196 
- Miroslav Lajcak, High Representative (2007-2009) 
 
 This example demonstrates that the OHR and internationals were aware they of 
loosing the leviathan role previously championed during the years of Petritsch and 
Ashdown. Lajcak was quick to camouflage the OHR in the costume of European 
integration. Within this role, the OHR added itself to the list of international institutions 
that the Bosnian elite could offer occasional gestures of goodwill to gain funding. But the 
OHR stepping into this role is more potent than the rest due to its historically important 
function of preserving Dayton. Recall that the OHR writes today that is tasked with: 
“working towards the point where Bosnia and Herzegovina is able to take full 
responsibility for its own affairs.”197 Under this aim the OHR has facilitated refugee 
resettlement and toppled secession claims. But, in the same paragraph, the OHR writes 
that it will “ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable 
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democracy on course for integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions.” This is evidence of the 
irreconcilable agendas of the OHR written on its very website.  
 As of May 2018, the current head of the OHR, Valentin Inzko, was appointed the 
post back in 2009 making him the longest serving HR. Coming from a long career in 
diplomacy, he served as the Austrian ambassador to Yugoslavia (1982-1986), headed the 
OSCE mission in Sandzak in 1992, and acted as the first resident ambassador in Bosnia-
Herzegovina after the war (1996-1999). Inzko did not deviate from the agenda of his 
predecessor, Lajcak, in that he highlighted the 5+2 agenda, closure of the OHR, and the 
European future of Bosnia in his first address as High Representative. Inzko did not 
attempt to reverse the death of the Bonn powers ushered under Lajcak and Schwarz-
Shilling, and also elected to embody EU integration. In fact, the Europeans officially 
placed their faith in Inzko. The EU-US Summit held in at the Butmir Camp Airbase 
outside Sarajevo in December 2009 formally requested HR Inzko to solely act as the EU 
Special Representative. Besides, this entailed excluding OHR experts from constitutional 
reform deliberations that occurred at the summit, hinting that being the Dayton watchdog 
was no longer the OHR’s jurisdiction. Instead, HR Inzko had been asked by his chief 
patrons (EU and the US) to act as the figurehead of EU integration.  
 The OHR was unsuitable for a EU role because it conflicts with Dayton. 
Therefore, this mission for the OHR became “too contradictory to uphold.”198 If the OHR 
compelled cooperation, was it as an international representative creating a sustainable 
state in the context of Dayton? Or, was it as a representative of the European Union 
explaining reform is necessary for European integration? Since self-sufficiency and EU 
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integration are not one in the same, HR Inzko had adopted a contradictory mandate. The 
5+2 agenda was a state-building measure that the OHR dubbed as a European project to 
earn the frail support of the Bosnian elite. However, the support never arrived.  
Consequently, in September 2011, the EU stripped the OHR of double hatting, opting to 
name Peter Sorensen EU Special Representative in a separate institution. In conclusion, 
after almost a decade and counting, the tenure of HR Inzko has witnessed the OHR 
playing a submissive role in Bosnian civilian affairs.  
 While the OHR is unsuitable for inducing EU cooperation, state capture is the 
underlying reason why these issues are unable to find genuine multi-ethnic consensus. 
Key findings of a report analyzing EU affects on police reform199 support that the source 
of the insurmountable problem with that of police reform has been the local “political 
level.” The elite networks of state capture, including budget allocation and appointments, 
have caused the police to remain stagnated in a post-conflict fragmentation. Due to the 
role of the EU in trying to combat state capture, this issue demands to be the centerpiece 
of the next section. 
 
5.3 Elite State Capture  
 This section will highlight claims that ‘state capture’ has been the thorn in the side 
of consociational logic. State capture is a term coined in 2000 by World Bank examining 
the transformation process in the context of the post-socialist societies of Eastern Europe 
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and the former Soviet Union.200 Originally, state capture referred to a group of oligarchs 
that take control of public institutions, politicians, and the media to advance their own 
enterprises. In the context of Bosnia, the ethno-nationalist political elite replaces this 
oligarchy, especially since 2005 when the internationals handed control of public 
administration back to them.201 Under this pretext, the Bosnian elites have concentrated 
their influence over government institutions, thus capturing the state and making 
themselves electorally untouchable. In my interview with the OHR on Janurary 10, 2018, 
I was told that the upcoming elections are, for the large part, already decided. More 
importantly, I was told that this was not atypical for Bosnia. Due to the state capture of 
the system, the positive incentive structure laid forth by Dayton is unable to operate.  
 The historical financial context is necessary to understand how the Bosnian elite 
came to capture the state today. As NATO bombs fell across the Western Balkans in the 
1990’s and American troops set foot on former socialist Yugoslav soil, the Western 
media portrayed a heroic intervention to end ethnic hatred. But, behind the scenes, the 
Western financial system had brought Yugoslavia to its knees. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which instituted a peace deal for the Bosnian war as well as a constitutional 
framework for the infant state, included the stipulation that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) would select the first leader of the Bosnian Central Bank that “shall not be a 
citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighboring State.”202 Bosnia was unable to 
create its own currency to spur investment, nor “permitted to mobilize its internal 
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resources.”203 The effect of this measure is a complete inability of Bosnia to self-finance 
its own reconstruction after the war. The European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development oversaw public sector restructuring, which means the sell-off of state and 
socially owned assets. The EBRD welcomed foreign direct investment (FDI), claiming to 
be transitioning Bosnia from a socialist economy to a market economy, but rather was 
selling cornerstone industrial enterprises of the state to foreign hands at rock-bottom 
prices. Local banks were unable to develop, resulting in the contemporary environment of 
predatory banks. For instance, the recent Bobar Banka collapse in the Republika Srpska 
is a vibrant example.204 Also, since Bosnia allocated Yugoslavia’s debt, much of the 
financial assistance simply went back into the pockets of foreign creditors, not the 
Bosnians themselves. “Debt piles up, and little new money goes for rebuilding Bosnia’s 
war torn economy.”205 While quoting Professor Chossudovsky, a published conspiracy 
author, and considering an enhanced filter of validation for his accusations, his words still 
illuminate a truth more discretely acknowledged by the Bretton Woods financial 
institutions. 
In 1994, the wartime authorities passed a law converting social property into 
state-owned. This is why the post-war privatization took place at entity level and 
was largely based on buying shares with certificates. As this was an entity matter 
and the Dayton agreement defines the FBiH as the Bosniak and Croat entity and 
the RS as the Serb entity, the process facilitated the privatization of some 10 
																																																								
203 Michel Chossudovsky, “Dismantling Former Yugoslavia: Recolonising 
Bosnia,” Economic and Political Weekly 31, no. 9 (1996): 522, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4403857. 
204 Dragan Maksimovic, “Ko će Vraćati Dugove BiH?” DW, February 8, 2017, 
http://www.dw.com/bs/ko-će-vraćati-dugove-bih/a-37452148. 
205 Chossudovsky, “Dismantling Former Yugoslavia,” 523. 
	 137	
billion KM worth of property without any inflow of fresh capital. Even worse, it 
effectively legalized the principle of ethnic privatization.206 
-Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University and the World Bank 
 
  As this example from the World Bank demonstrates, the claims of Chossudovsky 
are not far-fetched. The privatization of socially owned assets is more accurately 
described as the plundering of the wartime parties SDA, SDS, and HDZ. The Bosnian 
elite were able to make out with astronomical deals, and recall, this was the very elite 
culpable for the nationalism of the war. 
 Flash forward two decades of economic stagnation and unemployment amongst 
the highest in the world, the Bosnian citizens are the victims of the status quo the 
financial institutions and elite created. According to a study done by Prism Research207 in 
consultation with the Office of UN Resident Coordinator in January 2015, 73.1% of 1500 
interviewed Bosnians answered that it is more important for BiH to have a good 
constitutional organization rather than to be a member of the EU. This agreement cuts 
across cleavages: 78.1% of Bosniaks, 70.8% of Croats, and 68.1% of Serbs agree that 
constitutional functionality is priority to that of EU integration. Despite this poll lacking 
an illustration of the various views as to what a constitutional arrangement may be, this 
survey exemplifies a startling truth.  While the internationals spend billions of euros to 
compel Bosnian reforms to join the EU club, the citizens are more concerned with 
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reworking the consociational Dayton structure. The Bosnians do not want a EU future as 
much as they want a constitutional system capable of generating consensus on their own 
issues.  
 To this effect, another cross cleavage response of this study is that political elites 
constitute a far greater problem facing the country than fulfilling EU accession 
conditions. 88.2% of total respondents believe that the political elites are a problem – 
91.2% of Bosniaks, 90.1% of Croats, and 84.1% of Serbs. On the other hand, only 46.3% 
of total respondents considered the EU integration conditions to be a problem. Thus, the 
Bosnian citizens are dissatisfied with their political elite, and yet they keep electing them. 
This is due to the massive state capture the political elite enjoys, virtually ensuring their 
political immortality. The public’s resentment toward corruption is noted in another 
survey question where respondents, across ethnic cleavages, answered that corruption 
was more of a significant problem (69.4% for total) than the politicians (47.3%) or the 
economy (48.3%).  The fact corruption tops politicians as the greatest problem in this poll 
highlights that the citizenry are aware that state capture is the specific reason that the 
political elite are so disliked in the previous poll.  
Ethnicization serves as the means for turning public administrations into the core 
instrument of the systems of patronage, in two ways: First, it is responsible for 
the fragmentation of public administration in the highly decentralized Dayton 
state. Second, the legally prescribed ethnic representation in public 
administrations limits the development of a merit-based civil service. What’s 
more, it serves as an entry point for the politicization of civil services, especially 
its leading positions.208 
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 This example demonstrates that the consociational arrangement of public 
administration is the cause of the political elite gobbling up what some estimates put at 
80% of the state economy. One in every three jobs in Bosnia fall under the inflated 
umbrella of public administration.209 Thus, it is clear that the party elite consistently win 
elections in part because citizens are forced to vote for their economic well being, even if 
this goes against their beliefs of the sustainability of the state as a whole. This truth is 
demonstrated in the Prism survey results above. However, consociational theory is not 
the root of state capture, European financial institutions caused state capture.  
 The Spokesperson of the European Commission, Maja Kocijancic, said that 2018 
is a year of opportunity for the Western Balkan countries along the EU integration path; 
but, she emphasized, “The EU will not compromise on the accession criteria. Any serious 
progress is conditional upon effective reforms.”210 Thus validating the position of the 
European structures above Bosnia’s. The Instrument For Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA 
II) is the program that Bosnia directly benefits from today as a EU member candidate 
state. In 2017, the European Commission declared that 60,300,000 euros would be 
afforded to Bosnia, and 5,700,000 of which would be pledged under the title, “EU 
support to an efficient and responsible public administration.”211 The goal of this budget 
along with direct management strategy is to counteract state capture. 
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To contribute to the development of an efficient, professional, transparent and 
service oriented public administration that has achieved an increased level of 
harmonisation amongst the different levels of government and increasingly 
capable to deal with EU matters.212 
 
This commitment from the EU to this point illustrates that they are focusing their 
attention on the right issue. However, how can we tell that the millions of euros donated 
to Bosnia today is truly anti-state capture? Giving more money to political elites, whether 
foreign or domestic, is an ironic action to combat dishonest public administration. In fact, 
this creates another cycle of dependency that has been spinning for over two decades: 
European and Bosnian elite harmoniously offering accolades of goodwill and progress 
toward their eventual marriage, but the wedding date still not in sight.  The European 
elite benefit from the vital institutions and active status in the Bosnian tragedy, while the 
Bosnian elite benefit from financial patrons that outweigh any competitors in their 
economically burdened country. The status quo is sealed by the media’s rhetoric of ethnic 
antagonism. Rather than consociationalism being allowed to take root and generate 
consensus, it is blamed as the harbinger of division.  
 
5.4 Sejdic and Finci Reopens the Croat Question  
Furthermore, Mr. Jelavic had an explicit duty to serve the citizens and constituent 
peoples, in particular the Croat people, of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the 
legal institutions of the country at all levels. Instead Mr. Jelavic has directly 
violated the constitutional order of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This culminated on Saturday 3 March 2001 in 																																																								
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Mostar with the unconstitutional initiative led by Mr. Ante Jelavic to undermine 
the constitutional order of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and establish an illegal parallel structure.213 
 
 High Representative Petritsch issued the most high profile Bonn Power usage at 
the time by removing Ante Jelavic, the Croat member of the BiH Presidency. Ante 
Jelavic was the leader of HDZ, the party of traditional Croat nationalism. Ante Jelavic 
attacked the Dayton system for not protecting the Croat group in allowing for Bosniaks to 
vote for Croat candidates in the Federation. This, he argued, deceived the Croats from 
their rightful representation unlike Serbs in a separate entity and Bosniaks who enjoy a 
large majority in the Federation.  
 This issue is referred to as the Croat Question and has been the focus of Croat 
policy since Dayton. The Croats campaign there is a hole in the Dayton agreement in the 
implementation of consociational theory via segmental autonomy. The Croat elites do not 
espouse an issue with consociational theory itself; rather, they believe their autonomy is 
not safeguarded like the Serbs and Bosniaks. This is why many Croats believe it is their 
right to form a third entity. 
A third entity, or some other solution giving Croats a territorial framework that 
guarantees equality, would be the moment when Bosnia and Herzegovina stops 
being a stepmother to its peoples and becomes a real homeland.214  
-Igor Basic, Croat activist from Mostar 
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 In the 2000 general elections, the Croat Question first came to the limelight as 
HDZ lost multiple seats to moderate, but still technically Croat, politicians. Since Croats 
won these seats, the model of Dayton was not violated. However, the HDZ Croat party 
complained that the result violated Croat autonomy under consociational theory because 
Bosniaks were a significant portion of the voting base for the more moderate Croats. In 
the midst of an intense standoff, OSCE ambassador, Robert Barry, stepped in and 
declared that the election must stand, “The decision does not jeopardize the 
representation of Croats in the House of Nations. We do not think the HDZ/BH has the 
exclusive right to represent the interests of Croats.”215 This example highlights the 
international response to the Croat question. Consequently, HR Petritsch was obligated to 
dismiss HDZ leader Ante Jelavic when he declared the formation of Croat self-rule along 
the borders of the wartime Croat enclave. This was how the Croat question was born. 
 In a seemingly unrelated culmination of events (I will later connect them), the 
European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) in Strousburg, France issued a 
groundbreaking decision on Bosnia’s consociational structure in 2008. Two Bosnian 
citizens, Dervo Sejdic and Jakob Finci, lodged complaints with the ECHR in 2006. They 
were both prominent leaders, for instance Finci served as the Bosnian ambassador to 
Switzerland. But, Sejdic was of Roma origin and Finci of Jewish descent,216 thus, the two 
are considered members of the ‘others’ minority referred to in the constituent peoples 
decision of 2000. Remember, this decision enacted the grand coalition principle of 
consociational theory across all levels of Bosnian government. Therefore, since Dayton 
																																																								
215 Pat FitzPatrick, “Constitutional Crisis Continues,” Central Europe Review 
(October 29, 2000), http://www.ce-review.org/00/37/croatianews37.html. 
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requires that the BiH House of Peoples and Presidency to be composed solely of an equal 
share of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats,217 then Roma and Jewish citizens are legally unable 
of holding this public office. In this case, Sejdic and Finci were brining a suit against the 
Bosnian state for discrimination according to international law. 
 Through a scathing criticism of the Bosnian structure, the verdict of the Sejdic 
and Finci versus Bosnia and Herzegovina218 dealt a blow to consociational theory when 
the international pressure ought to have been its most passionate promoter. The Court 
found that Bosnia was in breach of Protocol 12 of the European Convention for Human 
Rights (ECHR), which provides the right to non-discrimination with regard to not 
allowing citizens who are not Bosniak, Serb, or Croat (constituent peoples) to stand for 
Presidential election. Furthermore, the Court found a violation with Article 14 of the 
ECHR, which provides for freedom from discrimination, in conjunction with Article 3 of 
Protocol 1, which protects free election to the legislative bodies, due to the incapacity of 
“others” to be eligible to run in elections. The decision evaluates three different proposals 
for constitutional remedy. Article 22 of the decision recommends that BiH House of 
Peoples be abolished and the House of Representatives inherit the vital interest veto. 
Also, Article 22 recommends the collective Presidency should wane its power in favor of 
the multi-ethnic Council of Ministers. Admittedly, the Court does not signal the end of 
consociational democracy in these comments. While the Court admits, “the time may still 
not be ripe for a political system which would be a simple reflection of majority rule,” the 
Court issued criticism against consociational protections against tyranny of the majority. 
																																																								
217 Dayton, annex IV, art IV and art V. 
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The following example illustrates how the European Court views consociational theory 
as unsustainable in the Bosnian state. 
However, sight should not be lost of the ultimate aim of constitutional reform in 
this area: having in future a single President elected in a manner ensuring that he 
or she enjoys trust beyond the ethnic group to which he or she belongs.219 
 
 While the international community applauded the ECHR verdict, and 
many believed that sweeping reform would occur before the 2010 general elections, the 
nationalist Bosnian-Croat elite realized the decision could be supremely useful toward 
their push for greater autonomy. Rather than centralize the country, the Sejdic and Finci 
case has led to greater fragmentation. In March 2013, leaders of Bosnia’s seven biggest 
parties met in Brussels with Stefano Sannino, Director-General for Enlargement at the 
European Commission, to find a solution to the vexed issue of the Court decision five 
years after the fact. They agreed, informally, that the Serb member of the collective 
presidency would be directly elected while Croat and Bosniak would be chosen 
indirectly. This is a far cry from the recommendations from the ECHR said Jakob Finci, 
one of the original plaintiffs of the case, “this agreement doesn’t solve question of all 
citizens but only ‘the Croat Question’. The new electoral voting system is just going to 
guarantee that the Croatian parties will get to elect who they want for their member of the 
presidency.”220 Essentially, the Croat elite took advantage of a European audience eager 
to hear propositions for reform. The Serbs are satisfied with Dayton solidifying their 
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autonomy territorially and Bosniaks possess a majority in the Federation. Only the Croats 
truly pose to gain from constitutional reform. Thus, Sejdic and Finci has been their way 
in the door, but addressing the Croat Question is the true motivation. 
It seems that they (Bosnian and European elite) talked about preserving the rights 
of ‘constituent peoples’. This is not a good solution. If we speak about the rights 
of minorities, then there is no need for more electoral units. 221  
-Dervo Sejdic, Plaintiff 
 
 The founder of the Croat nationalist party HDZ 1990, a party formed in 
opposition to the mainstream HDZ compliance with the 2006 April package, Bozo Ljubic 
was present at the 2013 negotiations in Brussels with the rest of the Bosnian political 
elite. In 2016, Ljubic filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court complaining that the 
electoral mechanism of sending a delegate of at least one of each constituent people from 
every canton to the House of Peoples violates the Bosnian Constitution.222 Ljubic 
believed the Croats had been cheated from their equal representation, “counties (cantons) 
with a mainly Bosniak population have always been able to choose at least two-thirds of 
the Bosniak delegates, at least two-thirds of the Serb delegates, three-quarters of 
delegates from the ‘Others’ group and at least one-third of the Croatian delegates,” he 
wrote.223 Even more so, Ljubic reasons that the ‘discrimination’ referred to by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdic and Finci decision applies to the Croat 
citizens who are barred from electing Croat officials. Since Bosniaks can vote for Croats 																																																								
221 Efendic, “Bosnia Solves.” 
222 Srecko Latal, “Bosnian Constitutional Court Decisions Open Pandora's Box,” 
Balkan Insight, July 7, 2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-
constitutional-court-decisions-open-pandora-s-box-07-07-2017. 
223 Eleanor Rose, “Bosnian Court Ruling Lends Weight to Croat Agitation,” Balkan 
Insight, December 15, 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-court-
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in the Federation BiH, and thereby can outvote the true Croat candidate in favor for a 
moderate (false) Croat, Ljubic has found a loophole in the Sejdic and Finci logic. The 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina partially accepted Ljubic’s appeal and 
gave the parliament six months to remedy the situation. By July 2017, the parliament had 
failed. The Court struck the current electoral law, leaving the Federation without means 
to elect its House of Peoples. Without the Federation House of Peoples, the state House 
of Peoples is unable to be chosen. With the general elections quickly approaching in 
2018, the Bosnian government is facing yet another crisis.  
 This issue is contemporary, but its roots trace back to the beginning of Dayton. 
Even though Croats comprise of less than 15% of Bosnia’s population, they are entitled 
to segmental autonomy along the lines of consociational theory. Since the Washington 
peace deal stuck them in the same entity with the Bosniaks due to the conditions of the 
war, the Croats have consistently complained about autonomous representation. 
However, even after the victory of SDP Croat Zeljko Komsic in 2006 and 2010 to the 
BiH president because of votes from Bosniaks, the Croats were unable to lodge 
destructive complaints. Recall from this chapter, the OHR dismissed Ante Jelavic for 
attempting to form a Croat entity. The Sejdic and Finci verdict has given the Croat 
nationalist elites the ability to shut down the consociational structure and the stability of 
the Bosnian state. Through this form of European external pressure, the international 
community has also undermined consociational theory. 
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